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 Given the high level of scrutiny on top executives in recent years, particularly those at 
banks, examining the impact of bank managers’ ability on financial reporting is of great value.  
This paper builds on models of bank efficiency in the banking literature to derive a measure of 
bank managerial ability, and examines how bank managerial ability impacts the quality of 
accounting information related to unique bank accounting issues.  I find evidence that higher 
ability managers do report higher quality accounting estimates for the allowance for loan losses 
and fair values of securities.  Additionally, I identify two settings that affect the strength of the 
relation between bank managerial ability and accounting quality, the Financial Crisis and when 
capital ratios are binding. I find evidence that this relation is stronger during the recent Financial 
Crisis but is attenuated when capital ratios are binding.  These findings should be of interest to 
investors, standard setters, and particularly bank regulators tasked with monitoring the stability 
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The Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 brought bank performance and bank financial 
reporting to the forefront of public attention.  Given the high level of scrutiny on top 
executives in recent years, particularly those at banks, examining the impact of bank 
managers’ ability on bank performance and reporting is of great value.  This paper builds 
on models of bank efficiency in the banking literature to derive a measure of bank 
managerial ability (hereafter BMA), and examines how bank managerial ability impacts 
the quality of accounting information related to unique bank accounting issues.  I 
examine two questions surrounding critical accounting issues at banks: 1) Do higher 
ability managers provide higher quality accounting for loan loss reserves and fair values?  
2) What settings strengthen or diminish the relation? 
Loans and securities make up the vast majority of bank assets (on average 89% in 
my sample).  Losses in the lending and securities portfolios are the primary causes for the 
capital deterioration that led to bank failures during the recent Financial Crisis (Cullen, 
2011).  Losses from loans or securities not only affect the individual banks experiencing 
those losses but can also have far-reaching and serious negative consequences for 
liquidity throughout the whole economy (Ivashina and Scharfstein, 2010; European 
Central Bank, 2011).  Evidence on the relation between bank managerial ability and 
critical bank-specific accounts enhances investors’, standard setters’, and regulators’ 
understanding of the quality of bank reporting.   
Understanding the relation between managers and accounting quality at banks 
should be of particular interest to bank regulators.  Such evidence gives regulators a 
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valuable mechanism to evaluate managerial performance and to determine best practices 
in bank accounting.  In addition, evidence on BMA and bank reporting can help 
regulators more efficiently allocate their monitoring resources through a better 
understanding of an important determinant of reporting quality.  This study also 
contributes to the academic literature by offering a measure of managerial ability 
designed specifically for banks that controls for bank characteristics. 
I define managerial ability as managers’ ability to efficiently convert resources to 
revenues, similar to past studies in the banking and accounting literature.  Thus a bank 
manager that generates greater revenues from the same set of resources would be deemed 
a higher ability manager.  I define accounting quality for the bank-specific accounts in 
this study as the ability for reported or disclosed accounting information to predict future 
economic realizations.  Thus, high quality accounting indicates that reported loan loss 
reserves and security fair values better predict future economic outcomes associated with 
that type of transaction.   
Converting bank resources into revenues requires bank managers to gather 
information from within the bank, from existing and potential loan recipients, and from 
the market as a whole.  To most efficiently allocate bank resources across numerous 
investment opportunities, bank managers must synthesize and weight information from 
these various sources.  Similarly, developing high quality accounting estimates also 
requires managers to gather information from within the bank, from existing loan 
customers, from the financial markets, and from the underlying economies of the regions 
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in which they invest.  Managers must understand and weight the information acquired 
from various internal and external sources.  As a result, managers with the skills to more 
effectively allocate the bank’s resources and more efficiently manage the bank should 
also have the skills to develop more predictive accounting estimates.
1
  Accordingly, this 
intuition predicts that high ability bank managers will report higher quality accounting 
estimates.   
However, managers face myriad and diverse reporting incentives that might 
incentivize them to over- or under-report loan loss reserves or fair values of securities.  
These incentives can arise from litigation costs, product market competition, cost of 
capital concerns, reputation concerns, and political pressure.  These diverse reporting 
incentives may dominate or obfuscate the relation between managerial ability and 
accounting quality.  Thus my primary hypothesis remains an empirical question. 
I also examine two settings where the predicted relation above may be 
strengthened or weakened: the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 and when firm-specific 
capital ratios are binding.  These settings are of particular importance to bank regulators 
as they represent settings where banks are on average more distressed.   
Task complexity theory in the psychology literature notes that the difficulty of a 
task impacts the extent that ability leads to greater judgment performance 
(Abdolmohammadi and Wright, 1987; Libby and Luft, 1993; Bonner, 1994).  Ability has 
a lesser impact on relatively easy tasks, but as tasks become more difficult ability 
                                                          
1 Demerjian, Lewis, Lev, and McVay (2011) also maintain this assumption. 
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becomes more important for judgment performance.  The inherent uncertainty of the 
Financial Crisis makes developing accounting estimates more complex, so during this 
period the relation between managerial ability and accounting quality may be 
strengthened.  However, many banks suffered considerable losses during the recent 
Financial Crisis, and bank managers were widely criticized in the popular press for their 
inability to see the oncoming economic problems.  It is possible that even the most able 
managers were unable to anticipate and understand the conditions of the recent Financial 
Crisis.  Thus, ex ante, the relation between managerial ability and accounting quality 
during the Financial Crisis is unclear.   
Banks face unique minimum capital requirements to ensure their outstanding 
deposits.  Past research shows that bank accounting estimates are sensitive to binding 
capital ratios (Moyer, 1990; Beatty, Chamberlain, and Magliolo, 1995; Collins, 
Shackelford, and Wahlen, 1995; Nissim, 2003).  Fear of violating capital ratios may 
cause all managers, regardless of ability, to report optimistic accounting numbers.  If the 
desire to report favorably dominates the ability to report accurately, one would expect no 
difference between the quality of accounting estimates reported by high and low ability 
managers.    
I build on an existing banking literature which uses Data Envelopment Analysis 
(DEA) to measure a bank’s efficiency in converting its resources into revenues (Barr, 
Seiford and Siems, 1993; Luo, 2003; Kao and Liu, 2004), and I regress my bank 
efficiency measure on a set of bank characteristics deemed outside of the purview of 
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management.  The residual from this regression is my measure of Bank Managerial 
Ability (BMA).
2
   
I find evidence that bank managerial ability is positively associated with 
accounting quality.  Specifically, my full sample results show a positive and significant 
relation between BMA and the accounting quality for the allowance for loan losses and 
for the fair values of securities.   
The above relation is strengthened in the Financial Crisis.  This evidence is 
consistent with task complexity theory but inconsistent with allegations in the popular 
press.  Finally, I provide evidence that the relation between bank managerial ability and 
accounting quality is weakened when banks face binding capital ratios but only for the 
allowance for loan losses.  This evidence is consistent with both high and low ability 
managers reporting optimistic loan loss reserves when capital ratios are tight. 
This study provides the first evidence addressing the impact of bank managerial 
ability on unique bank accounting issues, the allowance for loan losses and fair value of 
securities.  The quality of accounting surrounding loan quality and securities fair values is 
of particular interest to investors, bank regulators, standard setters, and the academic 
community given the recent financial crisis.  Increasing the quality of reserves for loan 
losses has been an objective of the SEC, and increasing the quality and use of fair value 
accounting remains on the agenda of accounting standard setters such as the FASB and 
                                                          
2
 While this approach is similar to the approach adopted by Demerjian, Lev, and McVay (2012), which 
uses a managerial ability measure based on the DEA procedure for non-financial firms, my BMA measure 




the IASB.  Understanding how managerial ability impacts financial reporting and the 
settings that impact this relation should directly aid bank regulators in determining best 
practices and in efficiently allocating their monitoring resources.   
This study is most similar to Demerjian, Lewis, Lev, and McVay (2011), which 
uses a managerial ability measure based on the DEA procedure for non-financial firms 
and relates that measure to accounting quality.  My BMA measure is designed for the 
banking sector, allowing the study to examine the unique and critical bank accounting 
estimates unlike Demerjian et al. (2011).   
The banking industry provides a particularly strong setting to examine the relation 
between managerial ability and accounting quality.  First, the nature of the banking 
business model mirrors the accounting function more closely than most industries.  It is 
easy to envision success in the pharmaceutical industry driven by the ability to develop 
unique drugs, or success in the computer software industry driven by higher caliber 
computer coding.  However, it is not clear how managers’ skills in managing those 
processes would translate to the accounting function.  In the banking industry 
management must identify the optimal investments from a set of financial asset to 
efficiently manage the bank and assess the values and risks of these assets when making 
accounting estimates.
3
  The abilities required to complete each of these tasks more 
closely align than industries.  Additionally, due to the critical nature of the bank 
accounting estimates examined in this study (particularly the allowance for loan losses), 
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 Nadler (1991) and Lewellyn and Muller-Kahle (2012) note the importance and responsibility of CEOs in 
establishing lending policies. 
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top level bank management is intricately involved in the estimation process for these 
accounts.  Thus unlike in many industries, at banks the same managers who determine the 
policies and procedures surrounding the investment decisions (such as the CEO, CFO, 
and Head of the Asset and Risk Management Division) are also involved in the 
accounting function for these assets.
4
  By utilizing this powerful setting to examine the 
role of managers, this study extends a growing literature in accounting, finance, and 
economics that examines the influence of managers on the organizational, investing, 
financial and accounting practices of firms (Bertrand and Schoar, 2003; Milbourn, 2003; 
Graham, Li and Qui, 2012; etc.).   
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 discusses relevant 
literature and develops my hypotheses.  Section 3 defines the variables used in the study.  
Section 4 presents the research design for two different empirical models.  Section 5 
tabulates and discusses results of the study, and Section 6 concludes. 
 
  
                                                          
4
 Regulators note the significance of these individuals in developing loan loss estimates by addressing 
guidance surrounding the issue to top management.  The Office of Thrift Supervision directed its 2009 
memorandum concerning the allowance for loan losses to CEOs (OTS 2009; later superseded by OCC, 
2013).  The SEC directed its 2009 letter concerning the allowance for loan losses to CFOs (SEC, 2009).   
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2.  LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESIS DEVELOPMENT  
2.1 Managerial Characteristics and Accounting 
 Recent research in accounting, finance, and economics attempts to understand the 
impact of managers, particularly CEOs, on the organizational, investing, financial and 
accounting practices of firms.  Bertrand and Schoar (2003) use manager fixed effects to 
capture a manager’s “style” and find CEOs to be instrumental in affecting firm’s policy 
decisions and performance.   Manager fixed effects and reputation measures are also 
linked to the extent and nature of executive compensation (Milbourn, 2003; Graham et 
al., 2012).  Recent survey research by Dichev, Graham, Harvey, and Rajgopal (2012) 
calls for more research that explores the “human element” to provide “a deeper analysis 
of the character of the managers running the firm.”  
 Accounting managerial characteristics research to date has focused exclusively on 
non-financial firms.  Three such studies use manager fixed effects (either CEO or CFO) 
to determine how a manger’s “style” correlates to certain accounting choices (Bamber, 
Jiang and Wang, 2010; DeJong and Ling, 2010; Ge, Matsumoto and Zhang, 2011).  
These studies refer to managerial fixed effects broadly as “style,” which may encompass 
abilities, risk preferences, personality, etc.  Bamber et al. (2010) finds that manager fixed 
effects explain differences in the frequency, precision, and bias of voluntary management 
financial forecast disclosures.  They also find that demographic information (career track, 
military background, period born) explains some of the differences between managers.  
Ge et al. (2011) finds that CFO fixed effects explain differences in accounting policies, 
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such as accruals, the use of operating leases, and the propensity to meet or beat earnings 
targets.  DeJong and Liang (2010) find that CEOs and CFOs impact accrual levels even 
after controlling for the managers’ economic and operating choices.
5
  These studies can 
determine that specific managers influence accounting choices and quality.  However, the 
use of manager fixed effects does not allow these studies to determine why specific 
managers influence accounting quality nor make any a priori predictions about managers 
or managerial ability.   
 Several studies use specific proxies to capture managerial ability to study its 
relation to accounting quality.  The results are mixed.  Aier, Comprix, Gunlock, and Lee 
(2005) finds a significant negative relation between CEO financial expertise (experience, 
advanced degrees, and professional certifications) and accounting restatements.  Francis, 
Huang, Rajgopal, and Zang (2008) finds a significantly negative relation between CEO 
media mentions (potentially a proxy for CEO reputation, but also a potential proxy for 
other CEO characteristics such as ego) and accounting quality.  Demerjian et al. (2011) 
uses a DEA-based measure of managerial ability for non-financial firms and finds 
managerial ability at non-financial firms to be positively related to earnings and accruals 
persistence.  
 The DEA-based measure used here has a distinct advantage over fixed-effect 
measures in that the DEA-based measure does not require managers to switch firms 
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 Recent studies examine managers’ influence on earnings quality.  Jiang, Petroni and Wang (2010) find 
accruals and beating earnings forecasts to be more sensitive to CFO than CEO equity incentives.  However 
Feng, Ge, Luo, and Shevlin (2011) find that CFOs equity incentives do not explain material accounting 




during the sample period in order to document the manager’s effect.  Rather the DEA-
based measure can be constructed from widely available financial data and can be 
calculated for a broad sample.  Additionally, the DEA-based measure compares 
management teams to the appropriate peer firms as described in detail below.  All of the 
above studies exclude financial firms.  This study offers a measure of bank managerial 
ability to the accounting literature and examines the relation between bank managerial 
ability and critical bank accounting estimates unexamined by past research.   
2.2Bank Managerial Ability and Accounting Quality 
Managing a bank requires a diverse set of skills.  Should the bank invest its 
marginal resources in securities, loans, trading assets, derivatives or federal funds?  What 
mix of loan types (residential real-estate, commercial real-estate, commercial, consumer, 
etc.) should the bank attempt to initiate, and what credit standards and lending policies 
will achieve that mix?  To answer these questions bank managers must acquire 
information from numerous sources, comprehend the internal and external factors that 
influence their business model and synthesize these components into a successful 
strategy.  For example, bank managers must understand their own current exposures as 
well as prevailing market trends in different industries, such as real estate prices or retail 
spending, to determine the risks and rewards of different investments.   
Many of the skills required to effectively manage a bank can also translate to 
developing accurate accounting estimates.  Demerjian et al. (2011) provide the most 
relevant discussion on this point.  They use a DEA-based measure of managerial ability 
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for non-financial firms and find accounting quality to be positively associated with this 
measure.  They attribute this relation to higher ability managers being “better able to 
synthesize information into reliable forward-looking estimates.”  Higher ability bank 
managers may be able to gather, understand and weight information to better value their 
assets and estimate risks.  If the skills and abilities required to manage a bank translate to 
developing accounting estimates, one would expect higher ability managers to develop 
higher quality estimates of loan losses and fair values.  
The banking industry provides a particularly strong setting to examine managerial 
ability’s influence on accounting.  The skills required to make investment decisions more 
closely mirror the skills needed to make accounting estimates in the banking industry 
than in other industries (pharmaceuticals, computer software, manufacturing, etc.).  
Additionally, the top bank managers responsible for developing the policies and 
procedures that govern the banks operations are heavily involved in the estimation 
process of the critical bank accounting estimates studied here.  
Note that managers face myriad and diverse reporting incentives.  The “skills 
transfer” prediction that higher ability bank managers will offer higher quality accounting 
estimates may not hold when managers’ incentives to under/over report dominate their 
ability to report accurately.  Managers may wish to under-report or over-report their 
accounting numbers for various reasons.  Managers may under-report to reduce ex post 
litigation costs (Skinner, 1994; Kasznik and Lev, 1995), to discourage new market 
entrants (Clarkson et al., 1994), or to protect proprietary information when competition is 
12 
 
high (Botosan and Stanford, 2005; Bens, Berger, and Monahan, 2011).  Political 
pressures can also lead managers to under report firm value (Watts and Zimmerman, 
1986).  A bank manager could report higher, more conservative loan loss reserves or 
lower fair values to minimize law suits if results are poor or to discourage new entrants to 
a particular lending market. 
On the other hand, managers may wish to over-report earnings when trying to 
raise new equity or debt (Korajczyk, Lucas, and McDonald, 1991; Lang and Lundholm, 
2000), to maximize their own equity incentives when selling shares or exercising stock 
options (Noe, 1999; Aboody and Kasznik, 2000), or to bolster their own job prospects 
(Fudenberg and Tirole, 1995).  A bank manager could report lower, more optimistic loan 
loss reserves or higher fair values to bolster the stock price of the bank.   
Thus, while higher ability managers may offer higher quality accounting 
estimates on average by transferring their skills from an operating setting to an 
accounting setting, reporting incentives may dominate the influence of ability.
6
  Similar 
to prior studies (McNichols and Wilson, 1988; Evans, Hodder, and Hopkins, 2010; 
Cantrell, McInnis, and Yust, 2012), I define accounting quality for the allowance for loan 
losses and fair values of securities as the ability for current period estimates to predict 
future period economic realizations, such as loan charge-offs and gains and losses from 
securities sales.  A stronger association between current loan loss reserves (fair values) 
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 Offering accurate disclosures also bring managers benefits, such as lower cost of capital (Brown, 1979), 
higher information quality (Easley and O’Hara, 2004; Lambert, Leuz, and Verrecchia, 2007) or enhanced 
reputation (Stocken, 2000). 
13 
 
and future loan losses (realized gains and losses on sales) represents higher quality 
accounting.  As the existence of the proposed relation is an empirical question I formally 
state the following hypothesis in the null form: 
H1:  Higher ability bank managers do not provide higher accounting quality by 
reporting current period accounting estimates that better predict future economic 
realizations. 
In addition to investigating the overall relation between bank managerial ability 
and accounting quality, I identify two settings where the relation may be stronger, weaker 
or non-existent: the Financial Crisis and when capital ratios are binding.  These settings 
are of particular interest to bank regulators and are discussed in the following subsection.   
2.3 Settings That May Influence the Role of Bank Managerial Ability on Accounting 
Quality 
The Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 
The Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 provides a unique and important setting to 
investors and regulators as the uncertainty during the period made understanding the 
quality of bank accounting estimates more difficult and more critical.  The uncertain 
nature of the period raises interesting questions about whether the ability of managers 
will impact the predictive ability of accounting estimates.   
Task complexity theory posits that as a task becomes more complex, ability has a 
greater influence on judgment performance (Abdolmohammadi and Wright, 1987; Libby 
14 
 
and Luft, 1993; Bonner, 1994).  For relatively simple tasks, high or low ability 
individuals reach similar judgments.  However, as tasks become increasingly complex, 
high ability is required to maintain adequate judgment performance; as such, high ability 
individuals outperform low ability individuals.  During the Financial Crisis, gathering, 
processing, and synthesizing information into accounting estimates would be a much 
more complex task than during a more stable economic period.  The increase in task 
complexity may cause bank managerial ability to exercise an even greater impact on 
accounting quality during the Financial Crisis.    
However, task complexity theory also posits that if tasks become exceedingly 
complex, ability no longer improves judgment: “as task complexity exceeds some 
maximum threshold…variance in skill or motivation is not relevant because performance 
is uniformly poor (Bonner, 1994).”  The complexity of judgments about the future during 
a period as uncertain as the Financial Crisis could exceed this maximum threshold where 
ability no longer increases accounting quality.  Banks suffered large losses during the 
Financial Crisis with numerous bank failings, suggesting that some bank managers did 
not understand their own current exposures during the period.  Fahlenbrach and Stulz 
(2011) find evidence that bank managers lost a considerable portion of their personal 
wealth during the Financial Crisis.  Thus, it appears that at least many bank managers did 
not anticipate the economic conditions.  If the setting is exceedingly complex, one would 
expect ability to have a significantly reduced influence on accounting quality, perhaps no 
influence.  It is uncertain whether, on average, bank managers of high ability could 
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provide higher accounting quality during the period.  Thus, I formally state the following 
hypothesis in the null form: 
H2:  The relation between bank managerial ability and accounting quality is 
unaffected during the Financial Crisis.   
Binding Capital Ratios 
The second setting I examine is where bank managers face binding capital ratios, 
a unique constraint due to the high level of regulatory oversight of the banking industry.  
A bank must maintain certain capital reserves (measured with capital ratios) to ensure 
adequate funding for its deposits.  Prior academic research finds that banks’ reported 
accounting numbers, including loan loss reserves, are sensitive to capital adequacy 
pressures (Moyer, 1990; Beatty et al., 1995; Collins et al., 1995).  Even though fair 
values disclosed under ASC 825-10 (originally SFAS 107) do not directly affect capital 
ratios, Nissim (2003) provides evidence that banks overstate their disclosed fair values 
when capital ratios are tight, presumably to appear less risky to the market and bank 
regulators.   
Fear of violating capital ratios or revealing that they are capitally constrained may 
constrain a bank manager of any ability from revealing his or her private information.  
The ability to develop more predictive estimates may be dominated by the desire to report 
favorably.  High ability and low ability managers may both choose to report loan loss 
reserves and fair values that are optimistic to appear more stable to bank regulators and 
investors.  Thus, when capital ratio constraints are binding, high ability and low ability 
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bank managers may issue accounting estimates with similar predictive ability.  I formally 
state the following hypothesis in the null form: 
H3:  The relation between bank managerial ability and accounting quality is 
unaffected when capital ratios constraints are binding.   
2.4 The Importance of Loan Loss Reserves and Fair Value Estimates 
Loans and securities make up an overwhelming portion of a bank’s balance sheet 
(roughly 89% in my sample).  Evaluating these accounts is critical in evaluating the bank 
as a whole.  A small change in the expected loss in the lending portfolio can result in a 
large change in income and bank equity.  For example, in my sample the average bank 
charges off only 0.4% of gross loans in any given year.  However, 0.1% of gross loans 
corresponds on average to roughly 12% of the bank’s net income, and one standard 
deviation-change in the value of net charge-offs is slightly larger than net income.  This is 
why the American Banking Association referrs to managing the credit risk of loan 
customers as “the most important aspect of the banking business model” (ABA, 2010).   
Securities are the second largest asset type held by banks, and the largest asset 
type for which fair value accounting plays a prominent role.  The fair value of available-
for-sale securities are recorded on the balance sheet with changes recorded in other 
comprehensive income, while held-to-maturity securities are reported at historical cost 
with fair values disclosed in the footnotes to the financial statements.
7
  The recent 
                                                          
7
 Designating securities as trading securities is a rare practice at banks as price changes flow through 
income.  Trading securities makes up only 0.5% of total securities in my sample. 
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financial crisis has placed fair value accounting at the center of a controversy.  Critics 
assert that fair value accounting can increase systematic risk through pro-cyclical trading 
(European Central Bank, 2004; Plantin, Sapra, and Shin, 2008; Barth and Landsman, 
2010), while others assert that no such relationship exists (Badertscher, Burks and 
Easton, 2012).   
Thus, understanding the accounting estimates designed to gauge the value of the 
loans and securities at a bank is critical to investors and regulators when assessing the 
value and stability of the bank.  Cullen (2011) finds that losses in the lending portfolio 
are the leading driver of bank failures during the recent financial crisis with 97.5% of 
failed banks from 2008 to 2010 experiencing deterioration in their lending portfolio in the 
quarters prior to failure.  He also finds losses from securities to be the second most 
prominent reason for capital deterioration leading to failures.  Reductions in capital from 
loan and securities losses not only affect the bank.  Reductions in capital can also have a 
systematic effect through the industry and the economy as a whole.  If capital tightens in 
the banking industry, the industry as a whole will be less willing to lend leading to a 
reduction in liquidity to the entire economy and restricting economic growth (Ivashina 
and Scharfstein, 2010; ECB, 2011).  For both fair values and loan loss reserves, 
understanding the quality of the accounting estimates may prove useful not only in 





3.  VARIABLE MEASUREMENT 
 This section describes the stand alone measures of bank managerial ability and 
accounting quality used in hypothesis tests in the following sections. 
3.1 Measuring Bank Managerial Ability 
Following a long stream of banking literature, I use Data Envelopment Analysis 
to construct a measure of bank efficiency.  I then purge firm-specific factors from this 
DEA-based bank efficiency measure to arrive at efficiency attributed to managerial 
ability.  The DEA-based measure offers distinct advantages over other measures of 
managerial ability proposed in prior literature, such as historical stock return, historical 
ROA, CEO compensation, or CEO tenure.  First, the DEA-procedure measures each bank 
relative to its peers and provides a relative ranking of all banks.  Second, the DEA-based 
measure can be calculated for each bank-year, or manager-year, observation without 
needing explicit CEO data, a long time series of data, or particular events like CEO 
turnovers.  Thus, the DEA-based measure can be generated for a much larger sample.   
The DEA procedure models efficiency with a ratio of outputs (incomes) to inputs 
(bank resources) similar to a return on investment measure.  However, unlike other 
efficiency ratios of outputs over inputs, the DEA efficiency measure does not require an 
“a priori specification of weights” (i.e. does not assume that all inputs and outputs are 
equally valuable across all banks).  For a more in depth discussion of the DEA procedure 
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as it relates to this paper and a summary of prior DEA-based banking literature, see 
Appendix B.
8
   
The DEA procedure produces a ratio-based efficiency scores resulting in an 
ordinal ranking of banks.  The efficiency scores are scaled to range from zero to one with 
higher scores representing more efficient banks.  I group banks by year and by size to 
ensure banks are benchmarked to their reasonable peers.
 9
  In spite of or perhaps due to 
the sizeable DEA banking literature, no singular agreed-upon measure of bank efficiency 
or bank managerial ability exists (Luo, 2003).  My objective is to measure the efficiency 
with which a bank manager converts the bank’s resources into revenues.  The inputs and 
outputs chosen differ from previous bank studies that simply address bank efficiency.  In 
other studies, bank equity may serve as a sufficient measure of bank resources in 
determining the efficiency of a bank.  I further differentiate amongst bank resources as 
the mix of resources can have a significant influence on what investments managers seek.  
Thus, the inputs selected below better attune this measure towards the contributions of 
management than past DEA banking studies. 
For the largest 100 banks I optimize:
 10
 
                                                          
8
 Section 1 of Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984) provides perhaps the most detailed discussion of the 
intuition behind the DEA procedure. 
9
 Grouping by year controls for time variant factors that may influence the conversion of resources to 
revenues.  Prior research notes the unique role of large banks in the economy (Janicki and Prescott, 2006; 
Khan, 2010).  I group the largest 100 banks within each year and calculate the DEA procedure separately 
for the largest banks and all other banks.  When the DEA procedure has many inputs but few banks, many 
banks will end up on the efficient frontier.  I assign 100 banks to the largest tier for each year to ensure an 
adequate sample size for the DEA procedure (Demerjian et al., 2012).  
10
 I estimate numerous variations of Equation 1 including more and less aggregated inputs, combining the 
two revenue measures, and dropping individual inputs.  The inferences of the study remain unchanged 
across the different DEA specifications.   
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Maxu, v θ = (u1Interest Revenuei,t + u2Non-interest Revenuei,t) / (v1Depositsi,t + 
v2FHLB Advancesi,t + v3Fed Funds Purchasedi,t + v4Other Short Term 
Borrowingsi,t + v5Goodwilli,t + v6Other Acquired Intangiblesi,t + v7Derivativesi,t + 
v8Loans Salesi,t)     (1a) 
For average and small banks I optimize: 
Maxu, v θ = (u1Interest Revenuei,t + u2Non-interest Revenuei,t) / (v1Depositsi,t + 
v2Borrowingsi,t + v3Goodwilli,t + v4Other Acquired Intangiblesi,t + v5Derivativesi,t)     
(1b) 
The eight input variables are measured at the beginning of year t with the 
exception of loan sales, which are measured over the course of the year.  The outputs 
include both interest and non-interest income, which make up the entire income stream 
for banks.  For bank’s resources I model a set of inputs associated with funds available 
for investment and acquired intangibles as these accounts are influenced by management 
and impact management’s ability to generate revenue.  I vary the inputs between the 
DEA procedure for the largest 100 banks in each year and for the remaining banks due to 
data availability and the differences in business model between the two tiers of banks.  
Appendix B offers a more in depth discussion of the inputs and outputs selected.   
After creating the bank efficiency measure, I purge the measure of bank 
characteristics that affect efficiency but are outside of the control of management, similar 
to Demerjian et al. (2012).  I regress the bank efficiency measure on five such 
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characteristics: bank size, bank age, cash availability, leverage, and auditor type.  I use a 
Fama-Macbeth specification of the following regression: 
Bank Efficiencyi,t = α + β1ln(Total Assets)i,t + β2ln(Employees)i,t + β3Free Cash 
Flow Indicatori,t + β4ln(Bank Age)i,t + β5Leveragei,t + β6BigNi,t + BMAi,t    (2) 
The residual from the above regression, BMA, serves as my empirical measure of bank 
managerial ability.
 11
  By regressing the DEA bank efficiency measure on firm 
characteristics that may affect efficiency but are outside of management’s control, the 
residual captures the efficiency that is not related to these firm characteristics.  I offer a 
more detailed discussion of how each of the independent variables included above may 
influence bank efficiency but not through the purview of management in Appendix B. 
As noted in Demerjian et al. (2012) this regression approach likely understates the 
ability measure as the variables used in the regression above could be influenced by 
managerial ability or could influence the hiring of a manager (i.e. large firms hiring better 
managers).  But conservatively attributing some managerial ability to the characteristics 
of the firm increases the likelihood that the residual captures only efficiency related to 
bank managerial ability and works against finding results in this study.   
I am able to estimate the bank efficiency score and BMA for 19,426 bank-year 
observations.  Of this sample, 10,971 bank-year observations have sufficient data 
available to perform my subsequent hypothesis tests.  Table 1 reports the descriptive 
                                                          
11 Similar to Demerjian et al. (2012), my measure of managerial ability applies collectively to the entire 
management team.  In one validation test I attribute bank managerial ability to a specific manager, the 




statistics for these variables as well as others used in my hypothesis tests.
12
  The mean 
bank efficiency score for the sample is 0.535, as expected given the variable ranges from 
zero to one.  The mean BMA is close to zero at -0.018.  The value is consistent with the 
variable’s construction as a residual.  Higher values of BMA correspond to higher 
managerial ability, so positive BMA values can be considered above average managers, 
and negative BMA values can be considered below average managers.  However, I use 
BMA as a continuous variable in my tests. 
To determine the validity of my BMA measure I compare it to several measures 
used as rough proxies for managerial ability proposed by prior studies.  I find that my 
BMA differs from the prior measures and better explains the short-term market returns 
around CEO turnovers than other measures.  I discuss the validation tests performed in 
Appendix C.   
3.2 Measuring Accounting Quality  
I define accounting quality as the ability of current period estimates to predict 
future period economic realizations, similar to prior studies (McNichols and Wilson, 
1988; Evans, Hodder and Hopkins, 2010; Cantrell, McInnis, and Yust, 2012).  First, I 
estimate accounting quality for the allowance for loan losses using the following 
regression: 
Charge-offsi,t+1 = α + β1ALLi,t + β2ALLi,t-1 + β3ALLi,t-2 + φi,t  (3a) 
                                                          
12
 See Appendix D for all tables.  
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In equation (3a) Charge-offsi,t+1 represents the loans charged-off by bank i during year t 
+1 scaled by total gross loans at the end of year t and ALLi,t represents the allowance for 
loan losses for bank i at the end of year t scaled by total gross loans at the end of year t.
13
  
Appendix A offers detailed variable definitions.   
Bank investors are highly concerned with the potential credit risk in the lending 
portfolio.  Expectations of charge-offs significantly impact market prices for banks 
(Wahlen, 1994).  Net charge-offs are loans deemed to be uncollectible and written-off 
from the bank’s balance sheet during the period, net of recoveries and serve as a widely 
accepted measure of credit loss for loans in the banking literature.
 14
   
The allowance for loan losses at a bank is analogous to the allowance for doubtful 
accounts at a non-financial firm, and the bank income statement account the loan loss 
provision is analogous to bad debt expense.  At non-financial firms managers focus their 
estimates on the income statement side (for example bad debt expense as a historical 
percentage of sales).  However, at banks managers are required to derive their estimates 
using a balance sheet approach.  Bank managers estimate the reserve needed based on 
their current understanding of the loan portfolio, past historical trends, and qualitative 
information.
 15
  This estimate is the allowance for loan losses on the balance sheet.  Thus 
one would expect the allowance for loan losses to become realized in the form of future 
                                                          
13
 Total gross loans is the gross historical cost of loans, before considering the allowance for loan losses, as 
presented on the balance sheet. 
14
 Recoveries represent collections, either whole or in part, of previously charged-off loans similar to the 
collection of a previously written-off receivable balance at a non-financial firm. 
15
 This estimate requires regular review of outstanding loans and historical averages/trends across loan 
types.  Banks additionally identify specific loans that require reserves.  For a more detailed discussion of 
the processes used to estimate the allowance for loan losses see 
http://www.fdic.gov/regulations/laws/rules/5000-4700.html.   
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charge-offs, the ultimate realization of loan loss at the bank.  Therefore, the relation 
between the allowance and charge-offs is the appropriate accounting relation to consider 
when examining accounting quality for loans.  Consistent with the conceptual definition 
of accounting quality above, banks with higher quality accounting surrounding its loan 
portfolio should report allowance for loan losses more highly correlated with future 
charge-offs.   
The purpose of Equation (3a) is to determine the ability of accounting (the 
allowance for loan losses) to explain the realization (charge-offs).  I include only 
accounting estimates as independent variables in the model, as I am only concerned with 
the information conveyed by accounting estimates.  However, the results of my 
hypotheses tests are unaffected by including prior period economic variables, such as 
Charge-offs at time t, in Equation (3a).
16
  I include a time series of accounting estimates 
for the allowance for loan losses as the realization period for Charge-offs can span 
multiple years.  The regression coefficients, β’s, measure the average relation between 
the current and lagged accounting and future charge-offs.  For example, β1 measures the 
amount of each dollar of loan loss reserve that gets charged-off during the following 
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 The results in following hypotheses tests are robust to several design choices surrounding equation set 
(3).  First results are unchanged if the lagged accounting variables are removed leaving only accounting at 
period t.  Additionally, results are unchanged if current period economics are included as independent 
variables.  For example, if charge-offs at time t is added to equation (3a) as an independent variable results 
remain unchanged.  Additionally, I controlled for non-performing loans at time t in equation (3a) and found 
similar results.  I find similar results if current economics are included as dependent variables and the 
incremental residual is measured before and after current period accounting is added.  Finally, results 






.  While this slope tells us about the average relation between the loan loss reserve 
and future charge-offs for the industry, I focus on the residual, φ.  As the regression 
equation estimates the portion of charge-offs that are explained by current accounting, I 
interpret the residuals as future charge-offs that are not predicted by accounting.   
The absolute value of the residual, Abs|φi,t|, serves as the empirical proxy for the 
accounting quality of the allowance for loan losses, where higher values of Abs|φi,t| 
correspond to more unexplained charge-offs and lower accounting quality. Lower values 
of Abs|φi,t| correspond to higher accounting quality.
18
 
Similar to the logic above, I define accounting quality surrounding securities fair 
value estimates as the ability of securities fair values to predict future realized gains and 
losses from securities sales.  Banks commonly estimate the fair value of their available-
for-sale (AFS) securities and their held-to-maturity (HTM) securities.  The difference 
between historical cost and fair value of AFS securities is captured in other 
comprehensive income until those securities are sold.  The difference between historical 
cost and fair value of HTM securities is disclosed in the footnotes as required under ASC 
825-10 (originally SFAS 107).  Thus, I use the difference between historical cost and 
                                                          
17
 While the allowance for loan losses attempts to estimate the losses incurred in the loan portfolio, not all 
estimated loan losses are expected to reach the realization/charge-off point within the following year.  The 
multi-period, rolling nature of the allowance account leaves one expecting β coefficients significantly 
positive yet less than 1.   
18
 The methodology described here runs a pooled regression within each year across all banks in the 
industry to capture the residual deemed accounting quality.  Inherent to the approach is the underlying 
assumption that the average firm is a reasonable benchmark for investors’ expectations and for adequate 
accounting.  Comparing firms to the industry norm in developing expectations for the future is an 
appropriate approach from a financial statement user perspective.  This assumption is maintained in 
numerous other proxy measures in accounting such as bad debt errors in McNichols and Wilson (1988), 
abnormal accurals in Jones (1991), and accruals quality in Dechow and Dichev (2002). 
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management’s estimate of fair value for each of these security types to predict future 
realized gains and loss on securities sales with the following model: 
RealizedGLSeci,t+1 = α + β1FVAFSSeci,t + β2FVHTMSeci,t + φi,t   
 (3b) 
In Equation (3b) RealizedGLSeci,t+1 represents the realized gain or loss related to 
securities recognized for accounting purposes scaled by total book value of securities at 
the end of year t, FVAFSSeci,t represents the unrealized gain or loss from AFS securities 
held by the bank scaled by the book value of securities at the end of year t, and 
FVHTMSeci,t represents the difference between the disclosed fair value of securities and 
the book value of securities scaled by the book value of securities at the end of year t.   
Equation (3b) includes both types of fair value estimates at banks.  Thus, the 
residual should serve as an appropriate proxy for the accounting quality of securities’ fair 
values.  I am only interested in the predictive ability of current period accounting and, 
therefore, include only accounting estimates as independent variables in Equation (3b).  
The above model requires no time series of accounting information, as dated fair value 
information should provide no additional information over the current fair values.  
Consistent with my definition above, I measure accounting quality for fair values as the 
extent that a bank’s fair value estimates map into future gains and losses from securities 
sales.   
As fair values attempt to capture what the market is willing to pay for a security, 
the difference between the fair value and book value of a bank’s securities portfolio 
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should be predictive of future gains and losses when securities are actually sold.  Higher 
quality fair value estimates would be better able to predict future gains or losses.
19
  The 
slope coefficient, β1, measures the average gain (loss) in year t+1 for each dollar that the 
fair value of securities exceeds its historical cost.  The residuals estimate the portion of 
future gains and losses that are unexplained by current accounting.  The absolute value of 
the residual, Abs|φi,t|, serves as the empirical proxy for the accounting quality of fair 
values with higher values representing lower quality accounting.   
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 Fair value estimates are a point in time estimate rather than a prediction of a future realization, and the 
time interval between estimate of fair value and the sale of the security can lead to appropriate disconnect 
between the fair value estimates and gains and losses on sales.  However, changes in fair values between 
estimation and realization should merely add noise to my measure working against finding significant 
results in my hypotheses tests.  As an empirical matter, the β1 coefficient in Equation (3b) is positive and 
statistically significant, verifying the accounting estimates and realizations are empirically linked. 
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4.  EMPIRICAL MODELS & DATA 
 I utilize two different empirical models by which to test the relation between bank 
managerial ability and accounting quality: the residual model and the interaction model.  
The residual model uses the free standing measure of accounting quality discussed in 
Subsection 3.2, while the interaction model regresses BMA directly on the future 
economic realization.  The following subsections lay out the models and discuss their 
relative strengths and weaknesses. 
4.1 Residual Model 
I estimate the following regression equation to test Hypothesis H1:  
Abs|φi,t| = α + β1BMAi,t + β2ln(Total Assets)i,t + β3LoanGrowthi,t + 
β4DepositGrowthi,t + β5BigNi,t + β6COVoli,t + β7CommLoansi,t + εi,t   (4a) 
Abs|φi,t| = α + β1BMAi,t + β2ln(Total Assets)i,t + β3LoanGrowthi,t + 
β4DepositGrowthi,t + β5BigNi,t + εi,t        (4b) 
Where Abs|φi,t| is the absolute value of the estimated residual to Equation set (3) for bank 
i during year t and BMAi,t is the bank managerial ability measure discussed in Section 3.1 
for bank i during year t.  The coefficient, β1, serves as the test for the relation between 
BMA and accounting quality.  Since larger residual values from Equation set (3) 
correspond to less predictive accounting, a negative β1 is consistent with high ability 
bank managers providing better accounting estimates for loan losses and securities fair 
values.   
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Equation (4a) is used to test the hypothesis related to the allowance for loan 
losses, while Equation (4b) tests the hypothesis related to the fair value of securities.  In 
each equation I include ln(Total Assets)i,t, the natural log of total bank i assets at the end 
of year t, to control for the effect of size on accounting quality.  Large firms may have 
more stable operations than small firms and thus be better able to estimate their future 
realizations (Dechow and Dichev, 2002).  Conversely, large banks may face more 
pressure to appear stable and thus report more biased and low quality accounting 
estimates.  I use both LoanGrowthi,t, the percent change in loans from the beginning of 
year t to the end of year t, and DepositGrowthi,t, the percent change in deposits from the 
beginning of year t to the end of year t, to control for the effect growth may have on 
accounting quality.  Firms experiencing considerable growth may find it more difficult to 
develop estimates of future realizations due to the changing nature of their size or scope.  
I include BigNi,t, an indicator equal to 1 when bank i uses a Big N auditor in year t and 
zero otherwise, to control for the effect of audit quality on accounting quality, as past 
research suggests that high audit quality correlates with high accounting quality (Becker, 
Defond, Jiambalvo, and Subramanyam, 1998).
20
   
For the test related to the allowance for loan losses, I include two additional 
controls. COVoli,t is the standard deviation of charge-offs at the bank over the three years 
culminating in year t.  This measure proxies for the underlying volatility of the bank’s 
loan defaults and controls for the inherent difficulty faced by management in estimating 
                                                          
20
 In untabulated analysis, I also include the standard deviation of cash flows over the preceding five years 
as a control for volatility.  This variable considerably limited sample sizes and was not statistically 
significant in any analyses, and thus is not included in those analyses presented here in the paper.  The 
results are unaffected by the inclusion of this control.   
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the allowance for loan losses.  CommLoansi,t is the percentage of the loan portfolio 
outstanding to commercial lenders at the beginning of year t.  These loans are less 
standardized than consumer loans and losses related to them are more difficult to predict 
(Ryan, 2007, pg. 91).
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The residual model utilizes a stand-alone measure of accounting quality.  By 
measuring accounting quality as the absolute value around the realized economic 
outcome the residual model addresses the impact of bank managerial ability on the 
predictive accuracy of accounting.    However, the residual model does not reveal the 
direction of accounting inaccuracies.  The interaction model developed in the following 
subsection does allow for the direction of accounting errors.  However, the residual 
model most closely relates to the research question of the nature of the relation between 
bank managerial ability and accounting posed in this study.  Additionally, it requires less 
complicated inferences when examining subsample and sensitivity results.  Therefore, I 
restrict my analysis of the subsample hypotheses and sensitivity tests to the residual 
model. 
4.2 Interaction Model 
 In estimating the interaction model I regress the future economic realization 
directly on bank managerial ability and controls: 
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 I also consider the composition of the securities portfolio as a measure of the inherent difficulty of 
estimated the fair values of securities.  However, a control that captured the portion of the securities 
portfolio classified as available-for-sale returned statistically insignificant results in all models and was 
dropped from the tests.  Thus, the quality of fair value estimates for securities is not sensitive to 
classification related to management’s intended horizon to sell.   
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Charge-offsi,t+1 = α + β1ALLi,t + β2BMAi,t + β3ALLi,t*BMAi,t + β4Charge-offsi,t + 
β5NPLi,t + εi,t         (5a) 
RealizedGLSeci,t+1 = α + β1FVSeci,t + β2BMAi,t + β3FVSeci,t*BMAi,t + 
β4RealizedGLSeci,t + εi,t        (5b) 
Where Charge-offsi,t+1 represents the loans charged-off by bank i during year t +1 scaled 
by total gross loans at the beginning of year t + 1, ALLi,t represents the allowance for 
loan losses for bank i at the end of year t scaled by total gross loans at the beginning of 
year t, BMAi,t is the bank managerial ability measure discussed in section 3.1 for bank i 
during year t, NPLi,t represents non-performing loans for bank i during year t scaled by 
total gross loans at the beginning of year t, RealizedGLSeci,t+1 represents the realized gain 
or loss related to securities recognized for accounting purposes scaled by total book value 
of securities at the end of year t, and FVSeci,t represents the sum of the unrealized gain or 
loss from AFS securities held by the bank (previously defined as FVAFSSec) and the 
difference between the disclosed fair value of securities and the book value of securities 
(previously defined as FVHTMSec) scaled by the book value of securities at the end of 
year t.   
 The above regressions are used to analyze how bank managerial ability and 
controls explain the variance in economic realizations.  Both the allowance for loan 
losses and the fair value of securities estimate the future realizable values of assets, and 
like all accounting estimates they contain some level of measurement error.  The greater 
the measurement error in the account, the lower the quality of accounting.  In both 
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equations, the β1 coefficient measures the relation (holding ability constant) between the 
accounting estimates and the economic realizations.   
First consider the loan loss equation.  The β1 coefficient in Equation (5a) can be 
interpreted as the average portion of each dollar of the loan loss reserve that results in 
charge-offs in the following year.  A significant positive relation of 0.5 would mean that 
a bank with an additional $1 of loan loss reserve experiences an additional $0.50 of 
charge-offs.  The β2 coefficient in Equation (5a) measures the relation (holding 
accounting estimates constant) between bank managerial ability and charge-offs.  One 
would expect higher ability bank managers to minimize loan losses (Barr, Seiford and 
Siems, 1993).  Thus, I expect a negative and significant β2.  In Appendix C I document 
that higher ability managers (higher BMA scores) experience lower future charge-offs. 
Likewise, the β1 coefficient in Equation (5b) can be interpreted as the average 
portion of each dollar of the estimated unrecognized gain or loss related to the fair value 
of securities that results in a realized gain or loss in the following year.  A significant 
positive relation of 0.5 would mean that a bank with an additional $1 of unrealized gains 
related to securities experiences an additional $0.50 of realized gain in the following 
year.  The β2 coefficient in Equation (5b) measures the relation (holding accounting 
estimates constant) between bank managerial ability and realized gains and losses.  
Obviously, one would expect higher ability bank managers to generate greater gains from 
securities, anticipating a positive and significant β2.   
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 For both equations, β3 is the critical coefficient of interest in the interaction 
model.  Greater measurement error in the accounting estimates will attenuate the relation 
between accounting estimates and future economic realizations, resulting in lower 
estimated regression coefficients.  Likewise, a higher coefficient would correspond to 
less measurement error and higher quality accounting.  A significant and positive 
coefficient β3 implies that the relation between the accounting estimates and future 
economic realizations is stronger when managerial ability is high.  Such evidence is 
consistent with the accounting estimates being measured with less measurement error by 
high ability managers and supports the hypothesis that high ability managers offer higher 
quality accounting.   
Consider an example at the extremes.  For a bank with the highest ability manager 
(assume a BMA score of one) β1 + β3 would represent the relation between the 
accounting estimate and the future realization.  However, for bank with the lowest ability 
manager (assume a BMA score of zero) β1 would represent the relation between the 
accounting estimate and the future realization.  If the β3 term is positive, then the relation 
is stronger for the bank with the high ability manager and weaker for the low ability 
manager, consistent with high ability managers making accounting estimates with less 
measurement error.  The difference between the two, β3, represents measurement error in 
the accounting estimate that is not present for the high ability managers.   
The major strength of the interaction model is that its β3 coefficient can be 
interpreted as a percentage of the accounting estimate that is predictive only for high 
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ability managers.  However, the interaction model becomes increasingly complex when I 
conduct subsample analyses as additional terms must be added to the interaction.  
Therefore, I proceed using the residual model for my subsample analyses for the 
remainder of the study.   
4.3 Data and Descriptive Statistics 
I obtain empirical bank data from SNL Financial from 1994 to 2010 to serve as 
the inputs and outputs for the DEA model as well as other control variables throughout 
the study.  I am able to obtain the necessary data for 10,971 bank year observations to 
perform tests related to the allowance for loan losses.  For the fair value tests machine 
readable data from SNL Financial begins only in 2005 (primarily during the recent 
Financial Crisis).  I randomly select 300 banks and hand collect data from 1999-2004 to 
supplement the machine readable data.  All empirical tests regarding the accounting 
quality of the fair values of securities is constrained to the random sample of 300 banks, 
totaling 2,447 bank-year observations.  Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the 
BMA measure, accounting quality measures and other variables used in hypothesis tests.  
The statistics presented are for variables winsorized at the 1% and 99% levels.   
BMA has a mean and median value very close to zero by construction, similar to 
Demerjian et al. (2011, 2012).  The mean bank size is roughly $2.1 billion while the 
median bank size is only $360 million.  This skewness reflects the fact that the US 
banking sector is heavily skewed by a small set of very large “money center” banks 
(Janicki and Prescott, 2006; Khan, 2010).  On average, banks establish a reserve equal to 
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1.39% of gross loans and charge-off roughly 0.4% of loans each year in my sample.  
Roughly 1.43% of gross loans are non-performing.  The distributions of these variables 
are consistent with prior published studies.  While the percentages represent small 
portions of gross loans, they can represent very large portions of income (Greenawalt and 
Sinkey, 1988; Hasan and Wall, 2004). 
Table 2 presents univariate correlations amongst the variables of interest in the study.  
Most notably the BMA measure is significantly negatively correlated with the accounting 
quality measure for both the allowance for loan losses and the fair value of securities 
(both Pearson and Spearman correlations), consistent with higher ability managers 





5.  RESULTS  
5.1 Bank Managerial Ability and Accounting Quality 
 Table 3 reports the results for Equation (4a) related to the allowance for loan 
losses.
22
  Both levels (Column I) and changes (Column II) specifications are presented.  
For the changes analysis, I regress the change in the dependent variable from year t+1 to 
year t+2 on the change in the independent variables from year t to year t+1.  The 
estimated “levels” coefficient on BMA is -0.159 and is statistically significant at the 5% 
level (two-tailed tests).  The estimated “changes” coefficient on BMA is -0.177 and is 
statistically significant at the 5% level (two-tailed tests).  Recall higher values of Abs|φi,t| 
correspond to lower accounting quality, thus the significant negative coefficients on 
BMA and Abs|φi,t| suggest that higher ability bank managers do provide higher 
accounting quality by reporting current period allowances for loan losses that better 
predict charge-offs.   
Columns (III) and (IV) of Table 3 report the level results of Equation (4a) within 
subsamples of the largest 100 banks and other banks.  In both sub-samples, I find similar 
results to the full sample with a negative coefficient of -0.164 for the small and average 
sample and a coefficient of -0.140 for the largest 100 banks sample.  Both coefficients are 
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 For all tests in this study, I adjust t-statistics using two-way clustering (clustering by firm and by time) as 
suggested by Petersen (2009) unless otherwise specified. 
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statistically significant at the 5% level.  Thus, the relation between BMA and accounting 
quality exists in both groups.
23
 
Table 4 reports the results for Equation (4b) related to the fair values of securities.  
Again, the estimated coefficients are negative and significant at the 5% level, -0.254 in 
the levels analysis and -0.292 in the changes analysis.  Columns (III) and (IV) break 
down the levels analysis into large banks and small and average banks and regresses 
Equation (4b) for the fair values of securities.  The negative and significant relation holds 
within each subsample. Thus, the evidence from the fair value analysis is consistent with 
the evidence from the analysis on the allowance for loan losses: higher ability bank 
managers offer fair values of securities that better predict future securities gains and 
losses.   
Larger banks report lower quality fair value numbers, but size is unrelated to the 
quality of the allowance for loan losses.  The Big N auditor variable correlates with 
higher quality estimates for the allowance of loan losses but not for fair value estimates.  
The growth variables were expected to correlate to lower quality accounting estimates 
(positive coefficients) as managers would generally find it more difficult to develop 
accounting estimates for an expanding business than a static business.  The deposit 
growth variable does indeed have a positive and significant coefficient in the loans and 
securities specifications.  However the coefficient on the loan growth variable is 
significantly negative in the allowance for loan losses specification.   
                                                          
23
 Levels analysis is tabulated, though inferences are unchanged with a changes specification. 
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One possible explanation is that loans are not likely to incur losses during the year 
the loan is originated.  Banks would rarely lend to borrowers in such poor financial 
condition that they default in the first year.  Thus, managers would find it easy to develop 
accounting estimates for these new loans as the estimates would be very small.  Bank 
managers with many new loans (high loan growth) could report higher quality allowances 
for loan losses than comparable bank managers with few new loans (holding other factors 
constant), explaining the negative coefficient on loan growth in Table 3.  However, the 
low number of defaults for these new loans should have no bearing on manager’s ability 
to estimate the fair value of the bank’s securities.  Therefore, I would not expect a 
negative coefficient on loan growth in the securities analysis presented in Table 4.  
Indeed the coefficients on loan growth in Table 4 are either insignificant or positive.   
 The controls for charge-off volatility and for the percentage of the loan portfolio 
devoted to commercial loans both load positively in Table 3.  The findings are consistent 
with the expectations.  More volatile charge-off behavior is more difficult to predict 
resulting in less predictive accounting estimates.  Likewise, the more commercial loans 
issued the less predictive accounting as these loans are less standardized and are more 
difficult to estimate. 
Table 5 presents the results for the interaction model.  Specifically, I estimate 
Equation set (5) above to test whether the relation between the accounting estimates and 
economic realizations is strengthened by BMA.  I predict and find a positive and 
significant coefficient on β1, higher accounting estimate corresponds to higher economic 
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realization, in both the allowance for loan losses model and the fair value of securities 
model.  I predict and find a negative and significant coefficient β2 in the allowance for 
loan losses model, consistent with better managers experiencing lower charge-offs.  I 
predict a positive coefficient β2 in the fair value of securities model and find it to be 
marginally significant, consistent with better managers generating more realized gains 
and losses from securities.   
The primary variable of interest in Table 5 is the interaction term.  I find the 
coefficient β3 on this term to positive and significant in the loans model, consistent with 
bank managerial ability strengthening the relation between the allowance for loan losses 
and future charge-offs.  This finding supports the intuition that high ability managers 
report an allowance with less measurement error and support the findings in the residual 
model.  However, β3 coefficient in the securities model is insignificant and, thus, does not 
provide evidence that BMA relates to less measurement error for the fair values of 
securities.  Taken together the combined results in Tables 3 to 5 suggest that bank 
managerial ability does relate to accounting quality and that higher ability bank managers 
do offer more predictive accounting estimates around these critical bank issues.   
5.2 Bank Managerial Ability and the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 
To study the relation between bank managerial ability and accounting quality 
during the Financial Crisis, I estimate the following model:  
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Abs|φi,t| = α + β1BMAi,t + β2FCi,t + β3BMA*FCi,t + β4ln(Total Assets)i,t + 
β5LoanGrowthi,t + β6DepositGrowthi,t + β7BigNi,t + β8COVoli,t + β9CommLoansi,t 
+ εi,t (6) 
where FC is an indicator equal to one when the bank-year observation is in years 2006-
2009 and zero otherwise (years 2006-2009 are used so that all years of data where either 
the accounting estimate or the economic realization falls during the 2007-2009 crisis 
period are included in the analysis), BMA*FC is the interaction of BMA and the FC 
indicator, and all other variables are as previously defined.   
I expect a positive coefficient β2 on the financial crisis indicator because I expect 
the uncertainty of the period to negatively impact accounting quality.  Hypothesis H2 
focuses on β3.  Since β1 is the relation between BMA and accounting quality during 
normal economic times, the interaction coefficient β3 tells us whether that relation is 
strengthen or weakened during the Financial Crisis.  Because I find β1 in Equation (4) to 
be negative, a significantly negative coefficient (same sign as β1) would imply the 
relation between managerial ability and accounting quality is strengthened during the 
crisis.  A significantly positive coefficient (opposite sign from β1) would imply a 
weakened relation, and an insignificant coefficient would imply that we could not reject 
the null hypothesis of no relation.   
Table 6 provides regression results for Equation (6).  The coefficient β1 is 
negative and significant for the loans specification and the securities specification, as 
reported in Tables 3 and 4.  The coefficient β2 is positive and significant at the 5% level 
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for both the loans and securities specifications, consistent with lower quality accounting 
estimates during the financial crisis.  Most importantly β3 is negative and significant in 
both specifications.  Thus I reject the null hypothesis, as the evidence supports a 
strengthened relation between managerial ability and accounting quality during the 
Financial Crisis.  The evidence is consistent with task complexity theory, with the 
Financial Crisis providing a more complex setting.  Bank managers were widely 
criticized in the popular press for failing to understand their own exposures during the 
financial crisis.  But the evidence here suggests that higher ability managers did better 
estimate the exposures in their lending and securities portfolios during the crisis.
24
   
5.3 Bank Managerial Ability and Binding Capital Constraints 
To test H3 I select a subsample of all banks in the lowest quintile of Tier 1 capital 
ratio and label those banks as having binding capital ratios. The model is as follows:  
Abs|φi,t| = α + β1BMAi,t + β2CapTighti,t + β3BMA*CapTighti,t + β4ln(Total 
Assets)i,t + β5LoanGrowthi,t + β6DepositGrowthi,t + β7BigNi,t + β8COVoli,t + 
β9CommLoansi,t + εi,t       (7) 
Where Captight is an indicator variable equal to one when the bank-year observation is in 
the bottom quintile of Tier 1 capital ratio in the given year and zero otherwise, 
BMA*CapTight is the interaction of BMA and the CapTight indicator, and all other 
variables are as previously defined.   
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 Inferences are unchanged if changes models are used for the tests of the financial crisis and 
binding capital constraints.  These results are untabulated for space consideration.   
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 I expect a positive coefficient β2 on the capital ratio tightness indicator because I 
expect binding capital ratios to negatively impact accounting quality on average.  The 
coefficient β3 is the coefficient of interest for testing H3.  Since β1 is the relation between 
BMA and accounting quality when capital ratios are not binding, the interaction 
coefficient β3 tells us whether the above relation is strengthen or weakened when capital 
ratios are binding.  A negative coefficient (same sign as β1) would suggest the relation is 
strengthened, a positive coefficient (opposite sign as β1) would suggest the relation is 
weakened, and an insignificant coefficient would suggest that capital ratios have no effect 
on the relation.    
Table 7 presents the regression results for the capital ratio tests corresponding to 
Equation (7).  β1 is negative and significant in each specification consistent with the 
primary findings for H1.  β2 is positive and significant in the loans specification 
suggesting that when capital ratios are tight banks offer lower quality allowances for loan 
losses.  Most importantly the coefficient β3 is positive, 0.167, and statistically significant 
with a t-statistic of 2.86 for the loans specification.  This finding suggests that binding 
capital ratios weaken the relation between BMA and accounting quality for loans.  
However for the securities specification β2 and β3 are insignificant, providing no evidence 
that capital ratios influence the quality of securities’ fair value estimates.
25
   
5.4 Alternative Explanation 
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 In addition to the test described here, I also estimate Equation (4a) in the subsample of firms with tier 1 
capital ratios in the lowest quintile of each year.  The coefficient estimates for BMA’s relation to 




Throughout the study I posit that higher ability managers may provide higher 
quality accounting estimates because the skills necessary to manage a bank efficiently 
may also be required to develop high quality estimates.  In this subsection I discuss and 
examine another mechanism by which bank managerial ability may be related to higher 
quality accounting.  In addition to “skills transfer,” managers with greater ability generate 
revenues more efficiently (by definition) and thus have stronger operating results.  These 
good managers may be more willing to disclose accurately simply because their strong 
results reflect favorably on them and the bank.  In contrast poor managers may be less 
inclined to disclose predictive accounting estimates for fear they may reflect unfavorably 
on them and the bank.  As such, low ability managers would be more likely to report 
optimistically biased accounting estimates because reporting more accurate estimates 
would reveal poor performance.   
This alternative explanation suggests that managers’ reporting incentives not their 
skills lead to the increase in accounting quality for high ability managers.  I perform two 
tests related to this alternative explanation.  First, I attempt to find evidence for the 
alternative explanation in my full sample.  Second, I select a setting where the reporting 
incentives are weak and the alternative explanation is least likely to explain the result and 
test whether the skills-transfer explanation holds. 
The alternative explanation posits that high ability managers report accurately 
because they have good results, and low ability managers skew their estimates 
optimistically because their true results would reflect poorly on them.  If the alternative 
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explanation is true then one would expect low ability managers to offer more 
optimistically biased accounting estimates.  Therefore in my first test I regress the signed 
residual from equation set (3), φ, which I term accounting bias, on BMA and control 
variables for my full sample.   
While the absolute value of these residuals is used to measure how well 
accounting predicted future economics, the signed residual allows us to see in which 
direction accounting estimates and realizations differ.  For the allowance for loan losses 
specification negative values of the residual would imply that charge-offs were lower 
than expected and would represent conservatively biased accounting estimates.  Positive 
values of the residual would imply that charge-offs were higher than expected and are 
optimistically biased.  For the fair values of securities specification negative values of the 
residual would imply that gains (losses) were lower (higher) than expected and would 
represent optimistically biased accounting estimates.  Positive values of the residual 
would imply that gains were higher than expected and accounting is conservatively 
biased.   
Table 8 Column (I) reports the loans specification result with a negative 
coefficient on BMA, -0.086, which is marginally significant with a t-statistic of  
-1.67.  Column (II) reports the securities specification result with a negative coefficient 
on BMA, -0.178, which is significant with a t-statistic of -2.42.  Thus there is marginal 
evidence that low ability managers offer more optimistic accounting estimates for the 
allowance for loan losses.  However, high ability managers actually offer more 
optimistically biased securities fair values.  This finding is in direct contradiction to the 
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alternative explanation explored here.  Thus Table 8 provides weak evidence that the 
alternative explanation explains the primary findings of the study.   
Next I examine whether my primary findings hold in banks in the top quintile of 
Tier 1 capital.  These banks should be far less concerned about signaling low quality 
through accounting estimates as they possess considerable capital reserves, thus 
dampening the impact of reporting incentive.  As such, the subsample offers a setting to 
examine the skills transfer intuition.   
Table 9 reports results of regressing Equation Set (4) in the top capital-ratio 
quintile of banks.  Consistent with previous findings, I find negative and significant 
coefficients on BMA for both specifications.  The evidence here provides support that the 
primary finding is driven at least in part by the abilities of managers and not by their 
reporting incentives.   




 The banking industry has been under increased scrutiny in the wake of the recent 
Financial Crisis.  Standard setters and bank regulators have become increasingly 
concerned with understanding the potential losses at banks and how accounting reflects 
those exposures.  This study examines the role bank managers play in determining 
accounting quality.  Specifically, I examine how bank managerial ability relates to the 
predictive ability of key accounting estimates surrounding the lending and securities 
portfolios.   
 The recent financial crisis highlights how losses in the lending and securities 
portfolios can have serious ramifications at individual banks (bank failures) and 
throughout the global economy (reduced lending and liquidity).  Investors, standard 
setters and regulators look to the accounting for loan losses as well as fair value estimates 
for securities to help evaluate the overall health of the bank.  Thus understanding a 
critical determinant of accounting quality for these estimates should aide these financial 
statement users in their judgments.  Bank regulators in particular could benefit from 
understanding the relation between bank managerial ability and accounting quality, as 
identifying high quality managers could help determine best practices in financial 
reporting for the industry and aide in efficiently allocating monitoring resources. 
I use a DEA-based measure of bank managerial ability with model inputs 
specifically designed for the banking industry.  I find that bank managerial ability is 
positively related to accounting quality, defined as the predictive ability of the allowance 
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for loan losses and securities fair values.  High ability managers possess skills in 
gathering, understanding, and synthesizing information into decisions about how to 
allocate bank resources.  The primary finding of this study suggests that these high ability 
bank managers are able to translate those skills to an accounting setting.   
Additionally, I identify two settings where the relation between ability and 
accounting quality may be strengthened or weakened: the recent Financial Crisis and 
when capital ratios are binding.  I find that the relation between managerial ability is 
strengthened during the Financial Crisis.  This finding is consistent with task complexity 
theory which states that ability has a greater impact on more complex tasks or in more 
complex settings, but is inconsistent with popular allegations that banks managers were 
unable to understand their own exposures during the crisis.  Finally, I find that the 
relation between bank managerial ability and accounting quality is weakened by the 
presence of binding capital ratios for the allowance for loan losses.  I do not find 
evidence that capital ratios impact the relation for the fair value of securities.  The 
findings are consistent with bank managers of any ability offering more optimistic 
allowances for loan losses in the presence of binding capital ratios, but not more 
optimistic securities fair values.  Taken together the findings support managerial ability 






Panel A: Variables Used in Measuring Bank Efficiency and Bank Managerial 
Ability 
For all variables the subscript i refers to the bank i, and the subscript t refers to year t 
(during year t for income or flow items and end of year t for balance or stock items). 
  
        Variable Definition 
 Bank Efficiencyi,t The result of the DEA procedure estimated on Equation (2) as 
described in Section 3.1.   
BMAi,t Bank Managerial Ability as measured by the residual from the 
residual from Equation (3) described in Section 3.1.   
ln(Total Assets)i,t The natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (source: 
SNL Financial). 
ln(Employees)i,t The natural logarithm of the number of full-time equivalent 
employees of the bank.  (source: SNL Financial). 
Free Cash Flow 
Indicatori,t 
An indicator variable equal to 1 when a bank reports non-
negative change in cash on its Statement of Cash Flows (source: 
SNL Financial). 
ln(Bank Age)i,t The natural logarithm of the number of years the bank has been 
listed in SNL including year t. 
Leveragei,t  
BigNi,t  
The ratio of total liabilities to total equity (source: SNL 
Financial). 
 
An indicator variable equal to 1 when the bank uses a Big N 
auditor and zero otherwise (source: SNL Financial). 
Panel B: Variables Used in Hypotheses Tests 
For all variables the subscript i refers to the bank i, and the subscript t refers to year t 
(during year t for income or flow items and end of year t for balance or stock items). 
 
Variable Definition 
Charge-offsi,t+1 The net loans charged-off (written-off as uncollectable) scaled 
by total gross loans at the end of year t (source: SNL Financial). 
ALLi,t The allowance for loan losses scaled by total gross loans at the 
end of year t (source: SNL Financial). 
FVAFSSeci,t The unrealized gain or loss from AFS securities held by the 
bank reported in other comprehensive income scaled by the 









FVHTMSeci,t The difference in the disclosed fair value of securities and the 
book value of securities scaled by book value of securities 
under ASC 825-10 (originally SFAS 107) as this amount relates 
to HTM securities at the end of year t (source: SNL Financial 
and hand collected). 
FVSeci,t The sum of the unrealized gain or loss from AFS securities held 
by the bank (previously defined as FVAFSSec) and the 
difference between the disclosed fair value of securities and the 
book value of securities (previously defined as FVHTMSec) 
scaled by the book value of securities at the end of year t 
(source: SNL Financial). 
RealizedGLSeci,t+1 The realized gain or loss related to securities recognized for 
accounting purposes scaled by total book value of securities at 
the end of year t (source: SNL Financial). 
Abs|φi,t| Accounting quality measured as the absolute value of the 
estimated residual to Equation set (3) multiplied by 100, as 
described in Section 3.2.  Higher values of Abs|φi,t| correspond 
to lower values of accounting quality.  Used to measure 
accounting quality of the allowance for loan losses, loan fair 
values and security fair values. 
φi,t The signed residual from Equation set (3) multiplied by 100.  
Used to measure accounting bias.   
FCi,t An indicator variable equal to 1 when the bank-year is during 
the Financial Crisis (years 2006-2009) and zero otherwise 
(years 2006-2009 are used so that all years of data where either 
the accounting estimate or the economic realization falls during 
the 2007-2009 crisis period are included in the analysis). 
CapTighti,t An indicator variable equal to 1 when the bank is in the lowest 
quintile of tier 1 capital during year t and zero otherwise 
(source: SNL Financial). 
ln(Total Assets)i,t The natural logarithm of the book value of total assets (source: 
SNL Financial). 
LoanGrowthi,t The percent change in loans from the beginning of year t to the 
end of year t (source: SNL Financial). 
DepositGrowthi,t The percent change in deposits from the beginning of year t to 
the end of year t (source: SNL Financial). 
BigNi,t An indicator variable equal to 1 when the bank uses a Big N 
auditor and zero otherwise (source: SNL Financial). 
COVoli,t The standard deviation of Charge-offs at the bank over the three 






CommLoansi,t The percentage of the loan portfolio outstanding to commercial 






Introduced in the late 1970’s, DEA uses a nonlinear non-convex programming 
model to estimate the relative efficiency of distinct “decision making units” at converting 
inputs (in this case bank resources) into outputs (in this case incomes) (Charnes, Cooper, 
and Rhodes, 1978).  The DEA models efficiency with a ratio of outputs to inputs similar 
to a return on investment measure: 
Σ
s
i=1 uiyik / Σ
m
j=1 vjxjk   k = 1,…, n       (8) 
where s = the set of outputs considered, y = the known value of the output s for the k
th
 
bank, m = the set of inputs considered, x = the known value of the input m for the k
th
 
bank, and n = the number of decision making units (i.e. banks). However, unlike other 
efficiency ratios of outputs over inputs, the DEA efficiency measure does not require an 
“a priori specification of weights and /or explicit delineation of assumed functional forms 
of relations between inputs and outputs.”  In other words the DEA procedure does not 
assume that all inputs and outputs are equally valuable across all decision making units.   
DEA is used in the banking literature in a variety of settings.   For example DEA 
is used to measure the efficiency of individual bank branches (e.g. Sherman and Gold, 
1985; Sherman and Ladino, 1995; Schaffnit, Rosen and Paradi, 1997; Wu, Yang and 
Liang, 2006), the technical efficiency of banks in converting deposit resources into 
outstanding loans (Miller and Noulas, 1996; Luo 2003), and overall bank efficiency 
(Barr, Seiford and Siems, 1993; Luo, 2003; Kao and Liu, 2004).   
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DEA bank efficiency research often focuses on predicting performance.  DEA 
analysis has been proposed as a regulatory tool to be used as an early screening device for 
potential bank failure.  Barr, Seiford and Siems (1993; as well as Barr and Siems, 1997) 
use a DEA model to measure overall bank efficiency at distressed banks and find bank 
efficiency to be negatively correlated with future bank failures.  Luo (2003) uses DEA 
bank efficiency to explain the acquisition behavior in the industry.  He finds target banks 
exhibit low levels of efficiency, presumably because inefficiently managed banks offer 
great opportunities for improvement under new management.  Kohers, Huang and Kohers 
(2000) also finds inefficient banks to be preferred acquisition targets, as event period 
abnormal returns are higher when the efficiency spread is larger between bidder and 
target.   
I group banks by year and size to control for time variant factors and to ensure 
that banks are benchmarked against reasonable peers.  I group the largest 100 banks 
within each year and calculate the DEA procedure separately for the largest banks and all 
other banks.
26
  I then maximize Equation (7) for each bank relative to the other banks in 
the sample.  This involves solving for the weights, u’s and v’s, such that each bank is 
assigned bank-specific values for each u and v that maximize its own efficiency score 
relative to all other banks if those weights are applied.  Weights are constrained to be 
non-negative as each bank input (resource) and output (revenue) are valuable.  After each 
bank has been assigned unique optimal weights, the ratio-based efficiency scores are 
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 Prior research documents the unique role of large banks in the economy (Janicki and Prescott, 
2006; Khan, 2010).  I assign 100 banks to the largest tier for each year to ensure an adequate 
sample size for the DEA to estimate the efficient frontier.  
53 
 
calculated by multiplying the optimal weights by the inputs and outputs.  Efficiency 
scores are scaled by the highest score in the group.  Thus efficiency scores range from 
zero to one with higher scores representing more efficient banks.
27
   
The Inputs and Outputs for Bank Efficiency 
 In spite of or perhaps due to the sizeable DEA banking literature, no singular 
agreed-upon measure of bank managerial efficiency or ability exists (Luo, 2003).  My 
objective is to measure the efficiency with which a bank manager converts its resources 
into revenues.  Revenues include both interest and non-interest income, which make up 
the entire income stream for banks.   
For bank’s resources I model a set of inputs associated with funds available for 
investment and acquired intangibles as these accounts are influenced by management and 
impact management’s ability to generate revenue.  I vary the inputs between the DEA 
procedure for the largest 100 banks in each year and for the remaining banks.  For the 
largest banks I include deposits, short-term borrowings, and advances from government 
regulatory agencies (FHLB advances and Fed Funds purchased).  The mix between 
different resources can have a considerable impact on the nature of the investments that 
bank managers will select when investing.  Thus I include each source of funds as a 
separate input in the DEA model.  For the banks not in the largest 100 in each year I 
include deposits and only one borrowings measure equal to the sum of the three 
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 For a more detailed discussion of the intuition behind the DEA procedure see Section 1 of 
Banker, Charnes and Cooper (1984). 
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borrowing variables reference above (short-term borrowings, FHLB advances and Fed 
Funds purchased) as a more granular breakdown is not widely available.   
For both DEA models I also include Goodwill, other acquired intangibles, such as 
core deposits, and derivative exposure, as these transactions represent investments that 
should generate future incomes and can restrict resources for other ventures.  Finally for 
only the largest 100 banks I also include the amount of loans sold over the year (generally 
in the form of securitizations), as loans sales are at the discretion of management and free 
up resources for use in other projects.  I only include this variable for the top 100 banks 
because loan sales either do not occur or occur in small percentage for the vast majority 
of average and small banks.
28
   
 For the largest 100 banks I optimize: 
Maxu, v θ = (u1Interest Revenuei,t + u2Non-interest Revenuei,t) / (v1Depositsi,t + 
v2FHLB Advancesi,t + v3Fed Funds Purchasedi,t + v4Other Short Term 
Borrowingsi,t + v5Goodwilli,t + v6Other Acquired Intangiblesi,t + v7Derivativesi,t + 
v8Loans Salesi,t)     (1a) 
For average and small banks I optimize: 
Maxu, v θ = (u1Interest Revenuei,t + u2Non-interest Revenuei,t) / (v1Depositsi,t + 
v2Borrowingsi,t + v3Goodwilli,t + v4Other Acquired Intangiblesi,t + v5Derivativesi,t)     
(1b) 
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 I estimate numerous variations of the model above including more and less aggregated inputs, 
combining the two revenue measures, and dropping individual inputs.  The inferences of the 
study remain unchanged across the different DEA specifications.   
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The eight input variables are measured at the beginning of year t with the exception of 
Loan Sales which is estimated over the course of the year.  I run the DEA procedure 
separately for each year in the sample to allow the efficient frontier to customize to the 
economic trends and opportunities available to bank managers during the year.  
Converting Bank Efficiency to Managerial Efficiency 
After creating the bank efficiency measure, I purge the measure of bank 
characteristics that affect efficiency but are outside of the control of management.  I 
regress the bank efficiency measure on five such characteristics: bank size, bank age, 
cash availability, leverage and auditor type, similar to Demerjian et al. (2012).  I expect 
large banks to operate more efficiently as they have greater negotiating power concerning 
rates and economies of scale concerning fixed costs.  I proxy for bank size using both the 
natural log of total assets, as well as the natural log of the number of bank employees.  I 
expect older, more established banks (measured as bank age) to benefit from reputational 
capital allowing them greater access to investment opportunities and greater negotiating 
power when entering into contracts, thus greater efficiencies.  I expect banks with free 
cash flows to have few constraints in pursuing investment opportunities, but a highly 
levered bank would potentially be less efficient because leverage concerns could restrict 
management’s investment choices.  I include an indicator for Big N auditor as a proxy for 
governance or scrutiny.  I expect better governed firms with Big N auditors to operate 




By regressing the DEA bank efficiency measure on the firm characteristics that 
may affect efficiency but are outside of management’s control, the residual captures the 
efficiency that is not related to these firm characteristics.  I label the residual bank 
managerial ability (BMA).  I use a Fama-Macbeth specification of the following 
regression: 
Bank Efficiencyi,t = α + β1ln(Total Assets)i,t + β2ln(Employees)i,t + β3Free Cash 
Flow Indicatori,t + β4ln(Bank Age)i,t + β5Leveragei,t + β6BigNi,t + BMAi,t    (2 repeated). 
As noted in Demerjian et al. (2011) this regression approach likely understates the 
ability measure as the variables used in the regression above could be influenced by 
managerial ability or could influence the hiring of a manager (i.e. large firms hiring better 
managers).  But conservatively attributing some managerial ability to the characteristics 
of the firm increases the likelihood that the residual captures only efficiency related to 
bank managerial ability and works against finding results in this study.     
 Table A1 presents results from the Equation (2) regression.    The log of total 
assets and employees as well as the Big N auditor indicator estimates are statistically 
significant with p-values well below 0.05.  The coefficient on bank age was marginally 
significant at the 10% level, and free cash flow and leverage were directionally consistent 
with predictions though not statistically significant.  Several of the factors chosen here 
differ from those chosen by Demerjian et al. (2012) because of the nature of the banking 
industry.  However, the factors used in this second stage regression by both papers 
exhibit similar coefficients.  Finding significant correlations in Equation (2) supports the 
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notion that the firm characteristics impact the efficiency measure and suggests that they 
should indeed be removed to create a managerial efficiency measure.  Following this 
logic, I use the residual from Equation (2) as my bank managerial ability measure.   




Validation of DEA-based BMA Measure 
In addition to DEA-based bank managerial ability and control variables I 
calculate four alternative measures of bank managerial efficiency put forth by prior 
research: historical stock return, historical return on assets (ROA), CEO total cash 
compensation, and CEO tenure. These four alternative measures of managerial ability are 
included in the validation tests for comparison purposes.  Historical stock return is the 
buy-and-hold return from the beginning of year t-5 to the end of year t-1.  Historical 
ROA is the five-year return on assets calculated as cumulative income before 
extraordinary items scaled by average total assets over the years t-5 to t-1.  CEO total 
cash compensation is the salary and cash bonus paid by the firm to the CEO during year t.  
CEO tenure is the number of years an executive has served as the CEO as listed on 
Execucomp. 
Table A2 presents descriptive statistics for the bank efficiency, DEA-based bank 
managerial ability measure and alternative managerial ability measures.   One of the 
advantages of the DEA measure is that it can be calculated for each firm-year, or 
manager-year, observation without needing explicit CEO data, a long time-series of data, 
or particular events like CEO turnovers.  As such I am able to calculate bank efficiency 
and bank managerial ability measures for 19,426 firm-year observations or manager-year 
observations in my sample.  Alternative measures of managerial ability yield smaller 
sample sizes due to data availability.  By design the bank efficiency measure ranges from 
0 to 1, least efficient to most efficient, with a mean of 0.532 and a median of 0.486.  Bank 
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managerial ability, a residual, has an inter-quartile range of 0.209 and ranges from -0.381 
to 0.463.  Higher values of BMA correspond to higher quality managers.  Because BMA 
is a residual, BMA can take a negative value.  I interpret this as lower quality or below 
average managers.  The distributions of bank efficiency and BMA are similar to those of 
the comparable variables in Demerjian et al. (2012).  Banks in the sample on average 
exhibit a buy-and-hold return from year t-5 to year t-1 of roughly 70%, pay their CEO’s 
roughly $1.4 million in cash each year, and employ CEO’s with an average tenure of nine 
years.  Banks offered higher returns and employed higher paid and more tenured CEO’s 
than non-financial firms studied by Demerjian et al. (2012). 
Comparison to Other Bank Managerial Ability Measures 
I compare my DEA-based measure of bank efficiency to a simple-regression-
based measure using the same inputs and outputs.  Simple regression analysis can be used 
to generate residuals that compare the efficiency of a firm to the average efficiency, but 
the non-parametric nature of the DEA procedure allows a relative ranking compared to 
the frontier.  Therefore, I regress bank income (interest income + noninterest income) on 
my collection of inputs (deposits, short-term borrowings, goodwill, etc.) and deem the 
residual as an alternative to bank efficiency.  I then compare this OLS-residual to the 
DEA measure and find a meager Spearman correlation of 0.052.  Such a small correlation 
suggests the nature of the DEA and OLS measures are considerably different.   
Next, I correlate the potential measures of bank managerial ability, as well as the 
bank efficiency measure to evaluate the association between the measures.  Table A3 
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contains the univariate Pearson and Spearman correlations.  The correlation between 
bank efficiency and bank managerial ability is moderate (Spearman correlation of 0.521).  
One should expect this correlation to be moderate given that managerial ability is a 
component of bank efficiency and may also signify that banks with more inherent 
efficiencies also hire more efficient managers.  Most importantly, the DEA-based 
measure of managerial ability is not highly correlated (all less than 0.050 or negative) 
with any other measures of bank managerial ability used in prior literature.  Thus the 
DEA measure cannot be approximated by any of the other more easily calculable 
measures.  Further none of the four traditional measures exhibit high correlations (all 
below 0.400) implying that, as a group, these measures provide at best a very noisy 
approximation for managerial ability. 
Explaining Market Reaction to CEO Turnovers with Managerial Ability Measures 
To test the validity of my DEA-based BMA measure, I assess its ability to predict 
short-window stock returns around CEO turnovers.  Hayes and Schaefer (1999) and 
Demerjian et al. (2011) both show that the stock market considers the ability of outgoing 
managers when pricing the firm around a CEO turnover.  The market reacts negatively to 
a CEO turnover when the outgoing CEO was of high ability but positively to a CEO 
turnover when the outgoing CEO was of low ability.  Therefore, if the DEA-based 
measure is valid, I expect a significantly negative relation between BMA and short-
window stock returns around a CEO turnover.  To test the validity and usefulness of my 
measure I regress the short-window return on BMA and the alternative measures.  If 
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BMA exhibits a negative and statistically significant relation to market reactions to CEO 
turnovers but other measures of managerial ability do not, then one could conclude that 
BMA better captures managerial ability. 
  I calculate short term stock returns over a 7 day window (-5, +1) from 8-K filing 
dates announcing CEO turnovers.
 29
  Including five days prior to announcement accounts 
for both a lag between actual market announcement of the CEO prior to the 8-K filing 
date and/or information leak prior to announcement.  Table A4 reports the results.  I 
separately regress the short-window returns on each ability measure reporting estimated 
coefficients, t-stats and the marginal effect of a one standard deviation change in the 
measure.  For BMA I find a statistically significant relation (p-value less than 0.05) in the 
predicted direction suggesting that BMA can explain some portion of market responses to 
CEO turnovers.  However, for each of the alternative measures I am unable to find a 
statistically significant result.  Thus Table A4 provides evidence that BMA is more 
closely aligned with market perceptions of managerial ability than the alternative 
measures.
30
   
Bank Managerial Ability and Future Loan Losses 
                                                          
29
 Audit Analytics provides the filing date for 8-K filings announcing the CEO turnover.  The 
majority of the 8-K’s are simply copies of press releases released on the same day as the filing.  I 
use a 7 day window (-5,+1) to estimate the short term return to allow for some variance between 
filing day and actual announcement day.  Audit Analytics data coverage for my sample begins in 
2001. 
30
 Since different measures require different types of data, each regression results in different 
sample sizes.  I run the regressions of short-window returns on BMA for only the samples 
available for each of the other measures.   I find stronger results for BMA within the Historical 
return and Historical ROA samples than had been exhibited by the previous measure.  The 




“Prudent bank managers devise loan policies that discriminate credit worthy 
borrowers from those in danger of default (Barr, Seiford and Siems, 1993).”  As my final 
validation test, I determine the relation between my BMA measure and the economics of 
banks’ loan loss behavior.  Specifically I examine the association between my BMA 
measure and future loan charge-offs.  I estimate the following regression equation:   
 Charge-offsi,t+1 = α + β1BMAi,t + β2Charge-offsi,t + β3NPLi,t + εi,t    (9) 
where Charge-offsi,t+1 represents the loans charged-off by bank i during year t +1 scaled 
by total gross loans at the beginning of year t + 1, BMAi,t is the bank managerial ability 
measure discussed in section 3.1 for bank i during year t, NPLi,t represents non-
performing loans for bank i during year t scaled by total gross loans at the beginning of 
year t.  Once again current charge-offs and non-performing loans serve as controls for 
future charge-offs consistent with prior literature (e.g. Wahlen, 1994).   
Table A5 reports the results for the regression of Equation (9) for both a levels 
and changes specification.  Control variables used in prior literature are statistically 
significant in the expected direction.  Most importantly the estimated coefficient on BMA 
is -0.009 in then levels analysis and -0.002 in the changes analysis.  Both are statistically 
significant at the 5% level (two-tailed tests).  Additionally both are economically 
significant.  The average charge-off in the sample is 0.41% of loans and 32% of income 
before extraordinary items.  A one standard deviation change in BMA corresponds to a 
0.14% change the percent of loans charged-off.  That change would represent a greater 
than one third increase to charge-offs and an 11% hit to profits.  The significant negative 
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relation between BMA and future loan charge-offs suggests high BMA managers 







 N Mean Median Std. Dev. 25% 75% 
Bank Efficiency 10,971 0.535 0.484 0.587 0.343 0.651 
BMA 10,971 -0.018 -0.044 0.157 -0.125 0.070 
Abs|φi,t|       
     ALL 10,971 0.401 0.230 0.584 0.117 0.407 
     FVSec 2,265 0.459 0.225 0.770 0.089 0.468 
Total Assets ($M) 10,971 $2,143 $360 $8,014 $178 $852 
Loan Growth 10,971 10.92% 8.23% 15.87% 1.29% 17.07% 
Deposit Growth 10,971 10.54% 7.31% 14.52% 1.80% 15.39% 
ALL 10,971 1.39% 1.24% 0.73% 1.00% 1.54% 
Charge-offs 10,971 0.42% 0.15% 0.84% 0.04% 0.39% 
NPL 10,971 1.43% 0.60% 2.44% 0.21% 1.51% 
COVol 10,971 0.78% 0.68% 1.06% 0.35% 1.13% 
CommLoans 10,971 32.28% 29.10% 21.02% 14.62% 47.34% 
FVSec 2,265 0.002% 0.002% 0.015% -0.005% 0.010% 
RealizedGLSec 2,265 0.020% 0.006% 0.880% 0.000% 0.191% 
 
This table reports descriptive statistics for the variables used in hypothesis test regressions and other 
variables of interest.  Bank Efficiency is the result of the DEA procedure estimated for Equation (1) 
discussed in Section 3.1 in year t.  BMA is the residual from Equation (2) described in Section 3.1 in year t.  
Abs|φi,t| is the proxy for Accounting Quality directly measured as the absolute value of the estimated 
residual to equation set (3) depending on the type of the accounting estimate in year t described in section 
3.2.  Total Assets is the total book value of assets at the end of year t (here no logarithm is taken for ease of 
interpretation).  LoanGrowth is the percent change in loans from the beginning of year t to the end of year t. 
DepositGrowth is the percent change in deposits from the beginning of year t to the end of year t.  ALL is 
the allowance for loan losses scaled by total gross loans at the beginning of year t.  Charge-offs is the net 
loans charged-off (written-off as uncollectable) scaled by total gross loans at the beginning of year t.  NPL 
is non-performing loans (loans over 90 days past due but not deemed uncollectible by the bank) scaled by 
total gross loans at the beginning of year t.  COVolt is the standard deviation of Charge-offs at the bank 
over the three years culminating in year t. CommLoanst is the percentage of the loan portfolio outstanding 
to commercial lenders at the beginning of year t.  FVSec is the sum of the unrealized gain or loss from AFS 
securities held by the bank (previously defined as FVAFSSec) and the difference between the disclosed fair 
value of securities and the book value of securities (previously defined as FVHTMSec) scaled by the book 
value of securities at the end of year t.  RealizedGLSec is the realized gain or loss related to securities 
recognized for accounting purposes scaled by total securities cost at the beginning of year t.  Variables are 





 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) 
(1) Bank Efficiency  0.551 -0.201 -0.163 0.127 0.015 0.103 -0.162 -0.207 -0.156 0.183 0.019 0.047 0.150 
(2) BMA 0.547  -0.251 -0.259 0.091 0.074 0.188 -0.195 -0.301 -0.318 -0.002 -0.015 0.054 0.122 
(3) Abs|φi,t| - ALL -0.176 -0.217  0.316 0.004 -0.179 -0.058 0.212 0.132 0.156 0.116 0.178 0.103 0.074 
(4) Abs|φi,t| - FVSec -0.107 -0.186 0.277  0.058 -0.063 -0.072 0.089 0.130 0.150 -0.011 0.037 -0.157 -0.086 
(5) Total Assets 0.173 0.070 0.044 0.010  -0.100 -0.077 0.057 0.123 0.086 -0.256 -0.049 -0.008 0.051 
(6) Loan Growth 0.014 0.107 -0.171 -0.053 -0.043  0.616 -0.237 -0.363 -0.385 -0.001 0.005 -0.126 -0.084 
(7) Deposit Growth 0.037 0.189 -0.082 -0.066 -0.022 0.741  -0.100 -0.183 -0.221 0.035 0.031 -0.014 0.010 
(8) ALL -0.124 -0.149 0.277 0.024 0.070 -0.258 -0.137  0.452 0.420 0.035 0.306 0.190 0.129 
(9) Charge-offs -0.232 -0.252 0.220 0.060 0.106 -0.320 -0.168 0.622  0.572 -0.125 0.180 0.167 0.169 
(10) NPL -0.118 -0.206 0.160 0.083 0.017 -0.316 -0.178 0.612 0.674  0.026 0.135 0.168 0.158 
(11) COVol 0.043 0.006 0.032 0.015 -0.066 0.028 0.039 0.025 0.027 0.052  0.060 0.028 -0.014 
(12) CommLoans 0.020 0.029 0.130 -0.004 -0.003 0.012 0.031 0.249 0.144 0.141 0.033  0.051 0.025 
(13) FVSec 0.062 0.073 0.009 0.008 0.004 0.000 0.005 0.019 0.007 0.009 0.002 0.019  0.289 
(14) RealizedGLSec 0.100 0.111 0.018 -0.062 0.009 0.008 0.020 0.055 0.049 0.052 0.009 0.013 0.219  
 
Emboldened numbers are statistically significant at the 5% level. 
 
This table reports univariate correlations for the variables of interest used in this study from 1994-2010.  Bank Efficiency is the result of the DEA 
procedure estimated for Equation (1) discussed in Section 3.1 in year t.  BMA is the residual from Equation (2) described in Section 3.1 in year t.  
Abs|φi,t| is the proxy for Accounting Quality directly measured as the absolute value of the estimated residual to equation set (3) depending on the type 
of the accounting estimate in year t described in section 3.2.  Total Assets is the total book value of assets at the end of year t (here no logarithm is taken 
for ease of interpretation).  LoanGrowth is the percent change in loans from the beginning of year t to the end of year t. DepositGrowth is the percent 
change in deposits from the beginning of year t to the end of year t.  ALL is the allowance for loan losses scaled by total gross loans at the beginning of 
year t.  Charge-offs is the net loans charged-off (written-off as uncollectable) scaled by total gross loans at the beginning of year t.  NPL is  
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Table 2 (Continued) 
 
non-performing loans (loans over 90 days past due but not deemed uncollectible by the bank) scaled by total gross loans at the beginning of year t.  
COVolt is the standard deviation of Charge-offs at the bank over the three years culminating in year t. CommLoanst is the percentage of the loan 
portfolio outstanding to commercial lenders at the beginning of year t.  FVSec is the sum of the unrealized gain or loss from AFS securities held by the 
bank (previously defined as FVAFSSec) and the difference between the disclosed fair value of securities and the book value of securities (previously 
defined as FVHTMSec) scaled by the book value of securities at the end of year t.  RealizedGLSec is the realized gain or loss related to securities 
recognized for accounting purposes scaled by total securities cost at the beginning of year t.  Pearson correlations are presented in the lower left, and 




Bank Managerial Ability and Accounting Quality of the Allowance for Loan Losses – Residual 
Model 
Abs|φi,t| = α + β1BMAi,t + β2ln(Total Assets)i,t + β3LoanGrowthi,t + β4DepositGrowthi,t + β5BigNi,t  + 
β6COVoli,t + β7CommLoansi,t + εi,t    
Dependent Variable:  
Inverse Accounting 
Quality (Abs|φ|) 
























BMA - -0.159** -0.177*** -0.164*** -0.140** 
  (-2.47) (-2.69) (-2.97) (-2.22) 
Ln(Total Assets) +/- -0.039* 0.002 -0.035 -0.066* 
  (-1.91) (0.05) (-1.47) (-1.75) 













  (2.45) (1.91) (2.19) (0.93) 
BigN - -0.102** -0.041** -0.085** -0.240** 
  (-2.27) (-2.02) (-2.04) (-2.46) 
COVol + 0.020*** 0.014*** 0.016*** 0.115*** 
  (3.95) (2.63) (3.41) (3.08) 
CommLoans + 0.003*** 0.001 0.003*** 0.004** 
  (6.22) (1.19) (5.98) (2.06) 
Adj R²  0.1586 0.1007 0.1596 0.1784 
N  10,971 9,897 9,962 1,009 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, 
respectively.  
This table reports results of the residual model described in sub-section 3.3 which regresses accounting 
quality for the allowance for loan losses on current period bank managerial ability and controls from 1994-
2010.  These regression equation and results shown below correspond to Equation (4a) in the text.  While I 
present my hypotheses in null form, I provide a column titled “Alt. Hyp. Expected Sign” in both this table 
and throughout the paper that notes the expected sign if results are consistent with the “skills transfer” 
intuition discussed in the paper.  I do this for the sake of clarity given the complexity of the tests used in the 
study.  Columns (I) and (II) report both levels and changes analysis for the allowance for loan losses.  
Columns (III) and (IV)  divide the sample on size into the two subsamples used separately in the DEA 
procedure described in sub-section 3.1 and examines the allowance for loan losses.  The regression results 
are presented separately for the largest 100 banks in each year and for all other banks.  Abs|φi,t| is the proxy 
for Accounting Quality directly measured as the absolute value of the estimated residual to equation set (3) 
in year t described in section 3.2.  Bank Managerial Ability is the residual from Equation (2) described in 
Section 3.1 in year t.  Ln(Total Assets) is the natural log of total assets at the end of year t.  LoanGrowtht is 
the percent change in loans from the beginning of year t to the end of year t. DepositGrowtht is the percent 
change in deposits from the beginning of year t to the end of year t.  BigNt is an indicator equal to 1 when 
the bank uses a Big N auditor in year t and zero otherwise.  COVolt is the standard deviation of Charge-offs 
at the bank over the three years culminating in year t. CommLoanst is the percentage of the loan portfolio 
outstanding to commercial lenders at the beginning of year t. The “Levels” columns present the dependent 
variables at time t+1 regressed on independent variables at time t.  The “Changes” columns present the 
change in dependent variable from time t+1 to time t+2, regressed on the change in independent variables 
from time t to time t+1.  Variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  The table reports OLS 
regressions coefficient estimates as well as t-statistics (t-statistics in parentheses) based on standard errors 




Bank Managerial Ability and Accounting Quality of the Fair Values of Securities – Residual Model 
Abs|φi,t| = α + β1BMAi,t + β2ln(Total Assets)i,t + β3LoanGrowthi,t + β4DepositGrowthi,t + β5BigNi,t + εi,t   
Dependent Variable:  
Inverse Accounting 
Quality (Abs|φ|) 






























BMA - -0.254*** -0.292** -0.255*** -0.293*** 
  (-3.38) (-2.99) (2.62) (-2.99) 
Ln(Total Assets) +/- 0.042*** 0.006*** 0.033*** 0.072*** 
  (2.92) (5.86) (2.63) (4.51) 













  (3.19) (-0.43) (-0.84) (-0.19) 
BigN - -0.117 -0.165*** -0.095 -0.077 
  (-1.28) (-3.58) (-1.01) (-0.14) 
      
Adj R²  0.1551 0.1001 0.1084 0.1956 
N  2,447 2,160 2,148 299 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, 
respectively.  
 
This table reports results of the residual model described in sub-section 3.3 which regresses accounting 
quality for the allowance for loan losses on current period bank managerial ability and controls from 1999-
2010.  These regression equation and results shown below correspond to Equation (4b) in the text.  While I 
present my hypotheses in null form, I provide a column titled “Alt. Hyp. Expected Sign” in both this table 
and throughout the paper that notes the expected sign if results are consistent with the “skills transfer” 
intuition discussed in the paper.  I do this for the sake of clarity given the complexity of the tests used in the 
study.  Columns (I) and (II) report both levels and changes analysis for the fair values of securities.  
Columns (III) and (IV)  divide the sample on size into the two subsamples used separately in the DEA 
procedure described in sub-section 3.1 and examines the fair values of securities.  The regression results are 
presented separately for the largest 100 banks in each year and for all other banks.  Abs|φi,t| is the proxy for 
Accounting Quality directly measured as the absolute value of the estimated residual to equation set (3) in 
year t described in section 3.2.  Bank Managerial Ability is the residual from Equation (2) described in 
Section 3.1 in year t.  Ln(Total Assets) is the natural log of total assets at the end of year t.  LoanGrowth,t is 
the percent change in loans from the beginning of year t to the end of year t. DepositGrowth,t is the percent 
change in deposits from the beginning of year t to the end of year t.  BigNt is an indicator equal to 1 when 
the bank uses a Big N auditor in year t and zero otherwise.  The “Levels” columns present the dependent 
variables at time t+1 regressed on independent variables at time t.  The “Changes” columns present the 
change in dependent variable from time t+1 to time t+2, regressed on the change in independent variables 
from time t to time t+1.  Variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  The table reports OLS 
regressions coefficient estimates as well as t-statistics (t-statistics in parentheses) based on standard errors 





Bank Managerial Ability and Accounting Quality – Interaction Model 
 
Charge-offsi,t+1 = α + β1ALLi,t + β2BMAi,t + β3ALLi,t*BMAi,t + β4Charge-offsi,t + β5NPLi,t + εi,t  
RealizedGLSeci,t+1 = α + β1FVSeci,t + β2BMAi,t + β3FVSeci,t*BMAi,t + β4RealizedGLSeci,t + εi,t   
Dependent Variable:  
Charge-offs or 
RealizedGLSec 
Alt. Hyp.  
Predicted  
Sign 








Intercept  -0.001  -0.001 
  (-1.42)  (0.54) 
ALL (FVSec) + 0.147*** + 0.271** 
  (3.07)  (2.47) 
BMA - -0.004** + 0.002* 
  (-2.22)  (1.89) 




     
Charge-offs  + 3.10***   
  (6.86)   
NPL + 0.135***   
  (5.24)   
RealizedGLSec   + 0.027*** 
    (2.84) 
     
Adj R²  0.4166  0.1031 
N  17,991  5,683 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, 
respectively.  
This table reports results of the interaction model described in sub-section 3.4, which regresses accounting 
quality on the allowance for loan losses, current period bank managerial ability, the interaction of the 
allowance for loan losses and BMA, and controls from 1994-2010.  The regression equation and results 
shown below correspond to equation set (5) in the text.  While I present my hypotheses in null form, I 
provide a column titled “Alt. Hyp. Expected Sign” in both this table and throughout the paper that notes the 
expected sign if results are consistent with the “skills transfer” intuition discussed in the paper.  I do this for 
the sake of clarity given the complexity of the tests used in the study.  ALL is the allowance for loan losses 
scaled by total gross loans at the beginning of year t.  Bank Managerial Ability is the residual from 
Equation (2) described in Section 3.1 in year t.  Charge-offs is the net loans charged-off (written-off as 
uncollectable) scaled by total gross loans at the beginning of year t.  NPL is non-performing loans (loans 
over 90 days past due but not deemed uncollectible by the bank) scaled by total gross loans at the beginning 
of year t.  FVSec is the sum of the unrealized gain or loss from AFS securities held by the bank (previously 
defined as FVAFSSec) and the difference between the disclosed fair value of securities and the book value 
of securities (previously defined as FVHTMSec) scaled by the book value of securities at the end of year t.  
RealizedGLSec is the realized gain or loss related to securities recognized for accounting purposes scaled 
by total securities cost at the beginning of year t.  Variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  The 
table reports OLS regressions coefficient estimates as well as t-statistics (t-statistics in parentheses) based 





BMA and Accounting Quality During the Financial Crisis of 2007-2009 
Abs|φi,t| = α + β1BMAi,t + β2FCi,t + β3BMA*FCi,t + β4ln(Total Assets)i,t + β5LoanGrowthi,t + 
β6DepositGrowthi,t + β7BigNi,t + β8COVoli,t + β9CommLoansi,t + εi,t     
Dependent Variable:  
Inverse Accounting Quality 
(Abs|φ|) 
Alt. Hyp.  
Predicted  
Sign 
Allowance for Loan 
Losses  
(I) 









BMA - -0.163** -0.335*** 
  (-2.40) (-3.53) 
FC + 0.224** 0.301*** 
  (2.33) (2.62) 
BMA*FC +/- -0.208*** -0.412*** 
  (-2.66) (-2.77) 
Ln(Total Assets) +/- 0.020 0.077*** 
  (1.43) (4.89) 









  (5.23) (2.37) 
BigN - -0.037 -0.046 
  (-1.49) (-0.11) 
COVol + 0.015***  
  (3.73)  
CommLoans + 0.003***  
  (6.65)  
Adj R²  0.1908 0.1907 
N  10,971 2,447 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, 
respectively.  
 
This table reports results of regressing accounting quality on current period bank managerial ability and 
controls, as shown in the equations below.  Regressions were performed on the sample of all banks-years 
during the financial crisis (independent variables measured in 2006 to 2009).  Years 2006-2009 are used so 
that all years of data where either the accounting estimate or the economic realization falls during the 2007-
2009 crisis period are included in the analysis.  While I present my hypotheses in null form, I provide a 
column titled “Alt. Hyp. Expected Sign” in both this table and throughout the paper that notes the expected 
sign if results are consistent with the “skills transfer” intuition discussed in the paper.  I do this for the sake 
of clarity given the complexity of the tests used in the study.  Abs|φi,t| is the proxy for Accounting Quality 
measured as the absolute value of the estimated residual to equation set (3) in year t described in section 
3.2.  Bank Managerial Ability is the residual from Equation (2) described in Section 3.1 in year t.  FCt is an 
indicator variable equal to one when the bank-year is in the financial crisis and zero otherwise.  Sizet is the 
natural log of total assets at the end of year t.  LoanGrowth,t is the percent change in loans from the 
beginning of year t to the end of year t. DepositGrowth,t is the percent change in deposits from the 
beginning of year t to the end of year t.  BigNt is an indicator equal to 1 when the bank uses a Big N auditor 
in year t and zero otherwise.  COVolt is the standard deviation of Charge-offs at the bank over the three 
years culminating in year t. CommLoanst is the percentage of the loan portfolio outstanding to commercial 
lenders at the beginning of year t. Variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  The table reports 
OLS regressions coefficient estimates as well as t-statistics (t-statistics in parentheses) based on standard 




BMA and Accounting Quality under Binding Capital Constraints  
Abs|φi,t| = α + β1BMAi,t + β2CapTighti,t + β3BMA*CapTighti,t + β4ln(Total Assets)i,t + β5LoanGrowthi,t + 
β6DepositGrowthi,t + β7BigNi,t + β8COVoli,t + β9CommLoansi,t + εi,t   
Dependent Variable:  
Inverse Accounting Quality 
(Abs|φ|) 
Alt. Hyp.  
Predicted  
Sign 
Allowance for Loan 
Losses  
(I) 












BMA - -0.139** -0.230*** 
  (-2.36) (-3.78) 




BMA*CapTight +/- 0.167*** 0.168 
  (2.92) (1.22) 
Ln(Total Assets) +/- 0.032* 0.087*** 
  (1.72) (4.44) 









  (2.23) (2.08) 
BigN - -0.099** -0.070 
  (-2.27) (-0.17) 
COVol + 0.020***  
  (3.85)  
CommLoans + 0.003***  
  (6.09)  
    
Adj R²  0.1637 0.1507 
N  10,971 2,447 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, 
respectively. 
This table reports results of regressing accounting quality on current period bank managerial ability and 
controls for the subsample of banks with Tier 1 capital ratios in the lowest quintile of banks from 1994-
2010 [1999-2010 for the securities analysis].  While I present my hypotheses in null form, I provide a 
column titled “Alt. Hyp. Expected Sign” in both this table and throughout the paper that notes the expected 
sign if results are consistent with the “skills transfer” intuition discussed in the paper.  I do this for the sake 
of clarity given the complexity of the tests used in the study.  Abs|φi,t| is the proxy for Accounting Quality 
directly measured as the absolute value of the estimated residual to equation set (3) in year t described in 
section 3.2.  Bank Managerial Ability is the residual from Equation (2) described in Section 3.1 in year t.  
CapTightt is an indicator variable equal to one when the bank-year is in lowest quintile of tier 1 capital in 
year t and zero otherwise.  Sizet is the natural log of total assets at the end of year t.  LoanGrowth,t is the 
percent change in loans from the beginning of year t to the end of year t. DepositGrowth,t is the percent 
change in deposits from the beginning of year t to the end of year t.  BigNt is an indicator equal to 1 when 
the bank uses a Big N auditor in year t and zero otherwise.  COVolt is the standard deviation of Charge-offs 
at the bank over the three years culminating in year t. CommLoanst is the percentage of the loan portfolio 
outstanding to commercial lenders at the beginning of year t. Variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 
level.  The table reports OLS regressions coefficient estimates as well as t-statistics (t-statistics in 




Bank Managerial Ability and Accounting Bias 
φi,t = α + β1BMAi,t + β2ln(Total Assets)i,t + β3LoanGrowthi,t + β4DepositGrowthi,t + 
β5BigNi,t + β6COVoli,t + β7CommLoansi,t + εi,t     
Dependent Variable:  



















BMA - -0.086* + -0.178** 
  (-1.67)  (-2.42) 
Ln(Total Assets) ? 0.099*** ? 0.061*** 
  (3.81)  (2.59) 











  (1.10)  (2.32) 
BigN - -0.228*** - 0.056 
  (-3.26)  (0.70) 
COVol + 0.005   
  (0.63)   
CommLoans + 0.001   
  (1.35)   
     
Adj R²  0.1315  0.0541 
N  10,971  2,447 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, 
respectively.  
 
This table reports the results of regressing BMA and controls on the signed residual to equation set (3), φ i,t.  
φi,t is a proxy for the accounting bias directly measured as the signed value of the estimated residual to 
equation set (3) in year t described in section 3.2.  The “Predicted Sing” columns correspond to the sing 
predicted by the alternative Explanation discussed in section 5.4.  Bank Managerial Ability is the residual 
from Equation (2) described in Section 3.1 in year t.  Ln(Total Assets) is the natural log of total assets at the 
end of year t.  LoanGrowth,t is the percent change in loans from the beginning of year t to the end of year t. 
DepositGrowth,t is the percent change in deposits from the beginning of year t to the end of year t.  BigNt is 
an indicator equal to 1 when the bank uses a Big N auditor in year t and zero otherwise.  COVolt is the 
standard deviation of Charge-offs at the bank over the three years culminating in year t. CommLoanst is the 
percentage of the loan portfolio outstanding to commercial lenders at the beginning of year t. Variables are 
winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  The table reports OLS regressions coefficient estimates as well as t-
statistics (t-statistics in parentheses) based on standard errors that have been adjusted for clustering by firm 






Bank Managerial Ability and Accounting Quality under Weak Reporting Incentives 
Abs|φi,t| = α + β1BMAi,t + β2ln(Total Assets)i,t + β3LoanGrowthi,t + β4DepositGrowthi,t + 
β5BigNi,t + β6COVoli,t + β7CommLoansi,t + εi,t   
Dependent Variable:  
Inverse Accounting Quality 
(Abs|φ|) 




Loan Losses (I) 











BMA - -0.177** -0.249*** 
  (-2.35) (-2.82) 
Ln(Total Assets) +/- 0.011 -0.052*** 
  (0.85) (-3.20) 









  (2.22) (2.93) 
BigN - -0.054 -0.022 
  (-1.36) (-1.16) 
COVol + 0.018***  
  (2.47)  
CommLoans + 0.005***  
  (8.67)  
    
Adj R²  0.2007 0.1091 
N  1,817 342 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, 
respectively.  
 
This table reports results of regression equation set (4) only in the subsample of banks in the top quintile of 
Tier 1 Capital.  While I present my hypotheses in null form, I provide a column titled “Expected Sign” in 
both this table and throughout the paper that notes the expected sign if results are consistent with the “skills 
transfer” intuition discussed in the paper.  I do this for the sake of clarity given the complexity of the tests 
used in the study.  Abs|φi,t| is the proxy for Accounting Quality directly measured as the absolute value of 
the estimated residual to equation set (3) in year t described in section 3.2.  Bank Managerial Ability is the 
residual from Equation (2) described in Section 3.1 in year t.  Ln(Total Assets) is the natural log of total 
assets at the end of year t.  LoanGrowth,t is the percent change in loans from the beginning of year t to the 
end of year t. DepositGrowth,t is the percent change in deposits from the beginning of year t to the end of 
year t.  BigNt is an indicator equal to 1 when the bank uses a Big N auditor in year t and zero otherwise.  
COVolt is the standard deviation of Charge-offs at the bank over the three years culminating in year t. 
CommLoanst is the percentage of the loan portfolio outstanding to commercial lenders at the beginning of 
year t. Variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  The table reports OLS regressions coefficient 
estimates as well as t-statistics (t-statistics in parentheses) based on standard errors that have been adjusted 
for clustering by firm and year.   
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Table A1: Converting Bank Efficiency to Bank Managerial Ability 




















Ln (Employees) + 0.057*** 
(4.11) 
90.5% 71.4% 





Ln (Bank Age) + 0.018* 
(1.65) 
71.4% 38.1% 
Leverage - -0.002 
(-1.43) 
85.7% 28.6% 





 Included   
N  19,426   
Adjusted R²  0.4197   
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, 
respectively.  
 
This table reports the estimated coefficients and Fama-Macbeth t-statistics for Equation (2) from 1994- 
2010.  Residuals from this estimation are my Bank Managerial Ability measure, BMA.  Bank Efficiency is 
the result of the DEA procedure estimated on Equation (1) as described in section 3.1.  Total Assets is the 
book value of total assets at the end of year t.  Employees is the number of full time equivalent employees 
employed by the bank at the end of year t.  Free Cash Flow Indicator is an indicator variable equal to 1 
when a bank reports non-negative cash from operations on its Statement of Cash Flows in year t.  Bank 
Age is the number of years the bank has been listed in SNL at the end of year t.  Leverage is the ratio of 
liabilities to equity at the bank at the end of year t.  Big N is an indicator variable equal to 1 when the bank 
is audited by a BigN auditor during year t and 0 otherwise.  Variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% 








Descriptive Statistics for Validation Test 
Panel A 












 Unique Banks 2,422 1,325 1,963 173 148 
 Unique Bank-Year Observations 19,426 8,918 10,869 1,116 983 
CEO Turnover Dates Available from Audit Analytics:       
 Unique Banks 142 133 140 24 23 
 Unique Bank-Year Observations 162 154 161 30 29 
 
Panel B 
Variable Observations Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min. 25% Median 75% Max. 
Bank Efficiency 19,426 0.532 0.222 0.155 0.367 0.486 0.652 1.000 
Bank Managerial Ability 19,426 -0.007 0.161 -0.381 -0.120 -0.031 0.089 0.463 
         
Alternative Measures of Ability 
Historical Return 8,918 0.728 1.120 -0.888 0.000 0.449 1.172 5.311 
Historical ROA 12,437 0.041 0.026 -0.065 0.029 0.044 0.056 0.098 
CEO Cash Compensation 
(Thousands) 
1,116 $1,436.19 $1,665 $262.75 $643.38 $957.36 $1,544.84 $11,400.9 
CEO Tenure (years) 983 8.709 6.989 1.000 3.000 7.000 12.000 34.000 
 
Panel A provides a summary of the sample size for each of the possible managerial ability measures from 1994-2010, including the subsamples with 
CEO turnover dates used in validation tests.  Panel B reports descriptive statistics for the variables of interest used in this study.  Bank Efficiency is the 
result of the DEA procedure estimated on Equation (1) as described in section 3.1.  Bank Managerial Ability is the residual from Equation (2) described 
in Section 3.1.  Historical Return is the buy-and-hold stock return from the beginning of year t-5 to the end of year t-1.  Historical ROA is the five-year 
return on assets calculated as cumulative income before extraordinary items scaled by average total assets over the years t-5 to t-1.  CEO total cash 
compensation is the salary and cash bonus paid by the firm to the CEO during year t.  CEO tenure is the number of years an executive has served as the 




















Bank Efficiency  0.521*** 0.129*** 0.208*** 0.120*** -0.017 
Bank Managerial 
Ability 
0.544***  -0.035*** 0.038*** -0.348*** -0.019 
Historical Return 0.171*** 0.003  0.379*** 0.104*** 0.049 
Historical ROA 0.203*** 0.033*** 0.341***  0.095*** 0.035 
Ln (CEO Cash 
Comp.) 
0.070** -0.298*** 0.095** 0.092***  0.095*** 
Ln (CEO tenure) -0.043 -0.022 -0.006 0.024 -0.080**  
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively.  
 
This table reports univariate correlations for the variables of interest used in this study from 1994-2010.  Bank Efficiency is the result of the DEA 
procedure estimated on Equation (1) as described in section 3.1.  Bank Managerial Ability is the residual from Equation (2) described in Section 3.1.  
Historical Return is the buy-and-hold stock return from the beginning of year t-5 to the end of year t-1.  Historical ROA is the five-year return on assets 
calculated as cumulative income before extraordinary items scaled by average total assets over the years t-5 to t-1.  CEO total cash compensation is the 
salary and cash bonus paid by the firm to the CEO during year t.  CEO tenure is the number of years an executive has served as the CEO as listed on 
Execucomp.  Pearson correlations are presented in the lower left, and Spearman correlations are presented in the upper right.  Variables are winsorized 




Explaining Market Reactions to CEO Turnovers with Managerial Ability Measures 





Historical Return Historical ROA Ln(CEO Cash 
Comp.) 
Ln(CEO Tenure) 
Return -0.132** -0.060 0.883 0.00 -0.002 
T-stat (-2.50) (-1.36) (0.63) (0.32) (-0.68) 
Marginal Effect -0.021 -0.067 0.023 0.004 -0.014 
Observations 162 154 161 30 29 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, respectively.    
This table reports results of regressing short-window returns surrounding the announcement of CEO turnovers on the different potential managerial 
ability measures from 1994-2010.  Announcement Return is the buy-and-hold return over the seven day period (-5,+1) where day (0) represents the 
filing date of the 8-K announcing the CEO turnover.  Bank Managerial Ability is the residual from Equation (2) described in Section 3.1.  Historical 
Return is the buy-and-hold stock return from the beginning of year t-5 to the end of year t-1.  Historical ROA is the five-year return on assets calculated 
as cumulative income before extraordinary items scaled by average total assets over the years t-5 to t-1.  CEO total cash compensation is the salary and 
cash bonus paid by the firm to the CEO during year t.  CEO tenure is the number of years an executive has served as the CEO as listed on Execucomp.  
Variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  Marginal Effect is the resulting difference in the dependent variable of a one standard deviation 




Table A5  
Bank Managerial Ability and Future Loan Losses (Economic Analysis) 
Charge-offsi,t+1 = α + β1BMAi,t + β2Charge-offsi,t + β3NPLi,t + εi,t     
Dependent Variable:  
Charge-offst+1 













BMA - -0.009** -0.002*** 
  (-2.01) (-2.98) 
Charge-offs + 0.405*** -0.299*** 
  (10.12) (-6.90) 
NPL + 0.143*** 0.178*** 
 
 
 (8.69) (4.72) 
Adj R²  0.4532 0.1322 
N  17,994 15,132 
***, **, and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels for two-tailed tests, 
respectively.  
This table reports results of regressing future loan charge-offs on current period bank managerial ability 
and controls, as shown in the equation below [corresponding to equation (10) in Appendix C] from 1994-
2010.  Charge-offst+1 is the amount of charged-off loans in year t+1.  Bank Managerial Ability is the 
residual from Equation (2) described in Section 3.1 in year t.  Charge-offst is the amount of charged-off 
loans in year t.  NPLt is the amount of non-performing loans at the end of year t.  The “Levels” column 
presents the dependent variables at time t+1 regressed on independent variables at time t.  The “Changes” 
presents the change in dependent variable from time t+1 to time t+2, regressed on the change in 
independent variables from time t to time t+1.  Variables are winsorized at the 1% and 99% level.  The 
table reports OLS regressions coefficient estimates as well as t-statistics (t-statistics in parentheses) based 
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